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RECENT DECISIONS
ANTITRUST - SECTION 7 OF CLAYTON ACT - EQUITABLE REMEDIES AVAIL-
ABLE TO COURT IN ALLEVIATING RESULTS OF ILLEGAL STOCK AcQuIsrrION. - B. I.
duPont de Nemours & Company had acquired approximately 63,000,000 shares of
common stock of General Motors Corporation. A prior determination by the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois' that such acquisition did
not violate section 7 of the Clayton Act2 was reversed by the United States Supreme
Court.3 The case was then remanded to the instant court "for a determination,
after further hearing, of the equitable relief necessary and appropriate in the public
interest to eliminate the effects of the acquisition offensive to the statute." 4 Held,
violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act does not make a divestiture of stockholdings
mandatory, and the court has power to grant such equitable relief as might be
necessary and appropriate. United States v. E.L duPont de Nemours & Co., 177 F.
Supp. 1 (N.D. III. 1959).
To facilitate an understanding of the position adopted by the Supreme Court,
and the final judgment rendered by the District Court to effectuate this position,
it is necessary to briefly delve into the history of the legislative and judicial policy
underlying antitrust law. Generally, it may be said that antitrust enforcement aims
at two principal goals - the free access of potential competitors into an industry,
and the prevention of administered rather than competitive prices.5 But the con-
cepts of elimination of competition 6 and monopoly7 are anything but static, and the
two terms are not always synonymous. s
The first major effort to prevent monopolies and restraints of trade came with
the Sherman Act of 1890.1 To enable the courts to draw the often fine lines between
those transactions thought to be economically deleterious, and those considered to
be legitimate, a "rule of reason" was adopted.10 But this rule was often applied ar-
bitrarily. To counteract this fact, the Supreme Court recognized that some concen-
trations of economic power were so serious a danger to free competition as to be
"unreasonable per se." 1 Furthermore, the act was invoked even to restrain those
1 United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 126 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ill. 1954).
2 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1952).
3 United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
4 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1952).
5 See Timberg, Equitable Relief under the Sherman Act, 1950 U. ILL. L.F. 629, 636-37
(1950).
6 "Workable competition is considered to require, principally, a fairly large number of
sellers and buyers, no one of whom occupies a large share of the market, the absence of
collusion among either group, and the possibility of market entry by new firms." Mason,
The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United States, 62 HARv. L. Rlv. 1265,
1268 (1949).
7 Monopoly has dimensions other than the exclusion of competitors from
a market. Monopolistic behavior may appear in an industry while there
are still competitors and while business rivalries are still vigorous ...
Symptoms of monopoly can be recognized whenever a competitor, or a few
competitors, achieve a market position wherein the competitor may choose
his competitive strategy. . . . [This marks] . . . the demise, first of price
competition, and then of other forms of competition in many industries.
Barnes, Competitive Mores and Legal Tests in Merger Cases: The DuPont-General Motors
Decision, 46 Gao. L.J. 564, 592-93 (1958).
8 Ibid.
9 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1952).
10 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60, 61-64 (1911).
11 See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); United
States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1926).
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monopolies resulting solely from internal growth.12 But the Supreme Court's in-
ability to arrive at an adequate criterion of illegality in the long series of antitrust
cases which have come before it has continued to leave the scope and extent of the
Sherman Act in some doubt.13 Because this was evident even at the time the instant
case was litigated, a skeptic could easily conclude that, generally speaking, the only
questions which have been definitively decided concern (1) the application of the
statute of limitations, estoppel and laches to the Government,14 and (2) the reso-
lution of doubtful points in favor of the Government.'5
To implement the provisions of the Sherman Act, Congress passed the Clayton
Act 8 in 1914. For the purposes of this discussion, the appropriate section is section
7.17 This was the section held applicable to the present case,' 8 which is significant
for several reasons: (1) since section 7 is phrased in the disjunctive, proof of either
a probable substantial lessening of competition or of a tendency toward monopoly
will suffice to show a violation of the statute;" (2) less is required to prove illegality
under section 7 of the Clayton Act than is required under section 2 of the Sherman
Act; 0 (3) specifically, section 7 requires only a finding of reasonable probability
of lessening competition or of tending toward a monopoly; 21 and (4) the section
was applied to a vertical integration for the first time in the instant case, despite the
fact that the Government believed otherwise. 22 It is also noteworthy that the in-
12 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir.
1945); accord, American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 814 (1946).
13 For a penetrating analysis of this problem, see Handler, Industrial Mergers and the
Anti-Trust Laws, 32 COLUM. L. REv. 179 (1932).
14 These defenses are not available against the Government under the Sherman Act.
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 623-24 (1953); United
States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940); United States v. Southern Pacific Co., 259
U.S. 214, 220 (1922); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917);
and the same would appear to hold true under the Clayton Act: "Suits brought under the
Clayton Act are not subject to any statute of limitations, and it is doubtful whether the
doctrine of laches applies as against the Government," United States v. E. I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 622 (1957) (dissenting opinion of Burton, J.).
15 Past cases point out that the judiciary fully realizes that it is often impossible for
the Government to establish, with certainty, the economic effect a given course of action
will have in the future. As a result, doubts regarding remedies are usually resolved in favor
of the Government and against the monopolist. See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United
States, 323 U.S. 386, 409 (1944); United States. v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S.
707, 726 (1944). And the same approach has been taken as to the scope of relief recom-
mended. See, e.g., Local 167, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 291
U.S. 293, 299 (1934). But see the instant case, United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours
& Co., 177 F. Supp. 1 (1959) for a contrary holding.
16 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1952). See also, SEN. REP. No. 698, 63d
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914); H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1914).
17 As originally enacted, section 7 provided that:
. . . no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or in-
directly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another
corporation engaged in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may
be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock
is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain
such commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly
of any line of commerce. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1952).
18 United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 588, n.4 (1957).
The Court here points out that the case was decided under the original section 7, and not
the 1950 amendment thereto, since the amendment was prospective in effect and therefore
not applicable to earlier acquisitions.
19 Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 284 Fed. 401, 407 (3d Cir. 1922); accord,
Swift & Co. v. FTC, 8 F.2d 595, 597 (7th Cir. 1925).
20 United States v. Standard Oil of California, 78 F. Supp. 850, 866-67 (S.D. Cal.
1948), aff'd, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
21 Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1922).
22 For data illustrating the Government's approach to section 7 and vertical integration,
see FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACqUISITiONS
168 (1955).
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vestment exemption, 23 vigorously relied upon by duPont and upheld at the District
Court level, 24 was found inapplicable by the Supreme Court.2 5
"[T]o limit further growth of monopoly and thereby aid in preserving small
business as an important competitive factor in the American economy," 2 Congress
passed an amendment to section 7 in 1950, which amendment, though not retroac-
tive in effect, 27 was intended to encompass an acquisition of assets which had not
been covered by the original act.2 8 There appears to be no agreement as to the
test to be applied in determining whether or not a transaction falls within the phrase
"substantially to lessen competition in any line of commerce." 29 But it seems fair
to say that
the Court [in the duPont case], by its repeated emphasis on the necessity
of a market analysis in determining a violation, makes it clear that sub-
stantiality does not mean mere dollar-size, independent of any inquiry
regarding market, but rather refers only to the relative size of the portion
of the relevant market affected.30
Since the objective of the Clayton Act is to "nip monopoly in the bud," 31 the
question as to "time of suit" is also important.3 2 By permitting the Government to
23 "This section shall not apply to corporations purchasing such stock solely for invest-
ment and not using the same by voting or otherwise to bring about, or in attempting to bring
about, the substantial lessening of competition .... " 38 Stat. 732 (1914), as amended, 64
Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1952).
24 United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 126 F. Supp. 235, 242 (N.D. Ill.
1954).
25 United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 601-06 (1957). The
view taken by the Supreme Court seems to more closely parallel the economic consideration
in the instant case for
Industrial and Commercial firms exist to carry on industrial and trading
operations, they are not investment companies as such. If such companies
accumulate liquid funds, such funds may require temporary investment,
presumably in readily liquidated assets such as treasury notes or government
bonds. There is, therefore, a presumption that a stock acquisition by an
industrial or commercial firm in another company is not "solely for in-
vestment," but . . . has been made for some other business reason ...
Barnes, supra note 7, at 601. (Emphasis added.)
26 S. RYp. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950); see also H.R. REsP. No. 1191, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949).
27 See Handler, Annual Review of Recent Antitrust Developments, 12 THE REcoRD 411,
425 (1957).
28 See H.R. RxP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1949).
29 See Sheehy, The Test of Illegality under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 3 ANTITRUST
BULL. 491 (1958).
30 46 CALIF. L. Rv. 266, 271 (1958). Since the "Quantitative Substantiality Test"
deals with mere size and dollar-volume, see Lvi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14
U. CHm L. Rav. 153 (1947), it is obvious that the court in the instant case has continued
to reject that test in favor of one of "Qualitative Substantiality." See Transamerica Corpo-
ration v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901
(1953). This latter test includes such factors as presently existing competition, the relative
size of the acquiring company, the amount of its participation in the present competitive
market, and the strength of the remaining competition. See H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949).
Therefore, to determine whether . . . section [7] has been violated the
Court must determine (1) the line of commerce, (2) the section of the
country, and (3) whether, in the light of all the competitive factors in
that line of commerce in that section of the country, the particular
acquisition of stock may have the effect of materially lessening competi-
tion or tending to create a monopoly.
... the statute obviously envisioned a situation where less than control
of a competing corporation might be sufficient to be a violation of this
section. American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152
F. Supp. 387, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958).
(Emphasis added.)
31 Transamerica Corporation v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953).
32 The Supreme Court's new approach to the concept of "time of suit" has been
severely criticized. See, e.g., Manne, The Perplexing DuPont Case: Additional Confusion in
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bring suit at any time (as was done in the instant case) it seems clear that a court
may force a corporation to abandon even that stock initially purchased for invest-
ment purposes 33 whenever the court finds it reasonably probable that such earlier
acquisition may now result in the creation of a monopoly in any line of commerce,
or in restraint of commerce.3 4
To understand the alleged "innovations" taken by the Supreme Court in the
duPont case, one must appreciate the several types of merger which are possible in
our economic climate. There are primarily three types: (1) horizontal mergers,
which involve two firms engaged in similar enterprises; (2) vertical mergers, which
involve a supplier acquiring the supplied corporation or vice versa; and (3)
conglomerate mergers, in which there is no apparent relationship between the busi-
nesses of the acquired and acquiring corporations s.3  The instant case involved a
vertical integration .3  And, although it has been strenuously argued that such a
form of merger is "by no means incompatible with vigorous competition" and is
more efficient,3 7 statistics apparently prove the contrary.-"
The early cases of "vertical forestalling" of competition were brought under the
Sherman Act and a violation was found in a few instances.39 But, because of the
"intent" test set down in the Paramount Pictures case, 40 many vertical integrations
were found not to be violative of antitrust principles. This apparent failure of the
Sherman Act caused the Government to seize upon section 7 of the Clayton Act as
a remedy.4 ' But one wonders why it was not invoked before, since the obvious purpose
the Law of Mergers, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 385, 411 (1957); Rogers, United States v. DuPont
- A Judicial Revision of Section 7, 2 ANTITRUST BULL. 577, 581 (1957). The real im-
portance of the court's approach seems to center around the standards of proof which will
be utilized. "The significance of the new time dimensions for section 7 is not that earlier
acquisitions may be questioned, for that could have been done at any time under the Sherman
Act. What is important is that in testing earlier acquisitions, Clayton Act standards rather
than Sherman Act standards shall apply. Barnes, supra note 7, at 577. (Emphasis added.)
33 See authorities cited notes 23, 24, 25, supra.
34 For an explanation of a possible way to eliminate "the danger of a later surprising
suit subjecting [a company] to the full force and effect of the duPont decision," see Manne,
supra note 32, at 411. See also S. REP. No. 198, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); H.R. REP. No.
7698, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
35 ... there are two clear zones of merger which do not seem to run contrary
to either the letter or spirit of the Sherman Act. These zones would seem
to be (a) where horizontal coagulations are putting together bits that are
non-contiguous, area-wise or product-wise and (b) where vertical coagula-
tions are putting together higher and lower levels of processing that do not
relate to each other as customers-suppliers.
Smith, Precedent, Public Policy and Predictability. 46 G.o. L.J. 633, 644 (1958). It would
appear that the same rules are applicable under the Clayton Act.
36 For a history of vertical integration, see Frank, The Significance of Industrial Inte-
gration, 33 J. POL. EcoN. 179 (1925). Note especially that prior to '1940 there were only
three cases heard by the Supreme Court of the United States involving a direct attack on
vertical integration: United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 254 U.S. 255 (1920); United
States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920); United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324
(1912), modified, 228 U.S. 158 (1913). See also, Comment, 19 U. CHI. L. Rv. 583, 584(1952).
37 Hale, Vertical Integration: Impact of the Antitrust Laws upon Combinations -of Suc-
cessive States of Production & Distribution, 49 COLUm. L. Rv. 921, 937-46 (1949).
38 See Dewing, The Financial Policy of Corporations 778, at 787 (3d ed. 1934); Smith,
supra note 35, at 643. But see Hale, supra note 37, at 951-52, for a persuasive argument
to the effect that vertical integration will substantially lessen competition only when there
is an imperfection in the market resulting from horizontal mergers.
39 See, e.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947); United States
v. General Motors Corporation, 121 F.2d 376, 404 (7th Cir. 1941).
40 "The legality of vertical integration under the Sherman Act turns on (1) the
purpose or intent with which it was conceived, or (2) the power it creates and the at-
tendant purpose or intent." United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 174
(1948); accord, United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 524-27 (1948).
41 "Vertical forestalling is clearly illegal when combined with unlawful monopoly
power. Some of the 'loose' forms of vertical control are apparently illegal per se, and others
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of the act was to prevent what the Sherman Act was unable to cure. And, despite
earlier cases to the contrary, 42 the Committee Reports published prior to the passage
of the 1950 amendment to section 7 make it unmistakably clear that section 7 was
to apply to vertical as well as horizontal acquisitions.4 3 Analogous legislative pre-
cedent was thereby established for the duPont case.
One final point is relevant to the historical background underlying the duPont
decision - namely, the methods of determining a "relevant market." It now seems
to be generally accepted that if there is no market of substantial size, the public
interest will not be affected regardless of what the consequences of an acquisition
might be." But this still leaves undetermined the troublesome problem of actually
defining such a market.45 Generally speaking, a determination of what constitutes
a market is a question of fact, governed by the exigencies of the situation,4 7 rather
than by fixed standards.4 This becomes even more evident when "substitute prod-
ucts" play a role in determining the relevant market.4 9
In the instant case we have a question of the scope of the equitable remedies
invoked by the District Court, and the court's right to administer them. Although
may be illegal even though connected with monopoly power not unlawful under the antitrust
laws as now interpreted." Comment, 19 U. CH. L. Rv. 583, 610 (1952). (Emphasis
added.)
42 See, e.g., United States v. Republic Steel Corporation, 11 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Ohio
1935).
43 See H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949). See also Dirlarn & Stelzer,
The DuPont-General Motors Decision: In the Antitrust Grain, 58 COLUM. L. Rzv. 24, 27-28,
29 (1958).
44 See International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
45 The necessity of such a determination is aptly pointed out in United States v. Co-
lumbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527 (1948).
46 "It is the geographic or economic area in which a monopoly makes its impact
felt that is the geographic or economic area of the market subject to the control of the
monopoly." Oppenheim, Timberg & Van Cise, Divestiture As A Remedy Under the Federal
Antitrust Laws, 19 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 120, 138 (1950). See also Times-Picayune Publish-
ing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); United States v. Standard Oil of California,
337 U.S. 293, 299 (1949); Maple Flooring Manufacturer's Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S.
563 (1925); Hansen, The Antitrust Laws in a Changing Economy, 6 U.C.L.A.L. Rzv. 183,
199 (1950).
47 As to the particular utility of this approach in the duPont case, see Barnes, supra
note 7, at 602, 603; Howrey, Advising Clients in the Light of the duPant (General Motors)
Decision, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 13, 19 (1958); Manne, supra note 32, at 395, 397, 410 (1957).
But for an analysis of the manner in which the definition of "relevant market" in this very
case could become a "two-edged sword," see Markham, The DuPont-General Motors De-
cision, 43 VA. L. REv. 881,-887, 888 (1957). For a comparative list of varying concepts of
the term "relevant market," see Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S.
594 (1953); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); Indiana
Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publishing Co., 293 U.S. 268 (1934);
Appalachian Coal, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Corn Products Refining
Co., 234 Fed. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
48 See Hansen, supra note 46, at 204. For an argument as to the futility of attempting
to seek fixed standards, see S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950); see also United
States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1957), where it was held
that the product market was the equivalent of those products that "have sufficient peculiar
characteristics and uses to constitute them products sufficiently distinct from all other[s] ...
to make them a 'line of commerce.' . . . " But for arguments favoring the adoption of a
strict market definition, see Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARv. L.
REv. 281 (1956); Note, 54 COLUM. L. RIv. 580, 603 (1954).
49 In determining the relevant market, the courts usually will not consider substitutes
other than those that are substantially fungible with the monopolized product and which
sell at substantially the same price. See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). Although the opinion in United States v. E. I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) was apparently contra to this practice, since the court
described the relevant market as the extent of interchangeability of flexible packaging materials
regardless of fungibiity or price, that case appears anomalous in light of the most recent
duPont decision. In the latter case the principle of the Times-Picayune case was reaffirmed.
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the Supreme Court remanded the case to the District Court "for a determination,
after further hearing, of the equitable relief necessary and appropriate in the public
interest to eliminate the effects of the acquisition offensive to the statute," 5 0 the Dis-
trict Court obtained its power, not from the Supreme Court's decision, but from
section 15 of the Clayton Act.5 1
The courts have outlined four main objectives that an antitrust equity
judgment must serve - it must prohibit past illegalities; prevent future
violations; restore competitive conditions; and make restitution for unjusti-
fiable competitive advantages.... [The] restorative function of the antitrust
judgment is a direct corollary of its preventive function.5 2
Aside from the oft-used injunction, a court enforcing the antitrust laws may
invoke one of the three remedies of dissolution, divestiture or divorcement.53 Fur-
ther, as was pointed out by Justice Jackson, 54 the court has a right to expand the
remedy beyond the actual violation.
In the instant case, the District Court allowed duPont to keep its legal title to
the General Motors stock, but divested duPont of its right to vote any of those
shares, granting this right to duPont's stockholders.55 In analyzing the court's ap-
proach, several factors must be considered. To begin with, the court, by founding
its remedy, to a large degree, on the basis of economic facts presented during the
hearing,56 demonstrated both erudition and practicality in approaching an extremely
complex problem. This is particularly important in antitrust cases because of the
wide discretion resting in the court. For, although "penalties which are not author-
ized by law may not be inflicted by judicial authority," 57 the court need not avoid
inflicting hardship on the defendant if this is the only method of achieving effective
relief.58 It is to the present court's credit that it appears to have obtained effective
relief without resorting either to hardship or penalty.
50 United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 607 (1957).
51 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1952). It is this section of the Clayton Act
which gives the District Court in the instant case all the powers of a court of equity.
52 Timberg, supra note 5, at 631, 633.
53 . . . "dissolution" refers to an antitrust judgment which dissolves or termi-
nates an illegal combination or association. . . . "Divestiture" is used to
refer to situations where the defendants are required to . . . dispossess
themselves of specified property in physical facilities, securities, or other
assets. "Divorcement" is commonly used to indicate the effect or result
of a judgment wherein certain types of divestiture are ordered ...
Oppenheim, Timberg & Van Cise, supra note 46, at 120-21. See also Howrey, supra note 48,
at 19.
54 When the purpose to restrain trade appears from a clear violation of law,
it is not necessary that all of the untraveled roads to that end be left open
and that only the worn one be closed. The usual ways to the prohibited
goal may be blocked against the proven transgressor and the burden put
upon him to bring any proper claims for relief to the court's attention.
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 400 (1947).
55 Three exceptions were made to this remedy, however: (1) Christiana and Delaware,
though stockholders of duPont, were not allowed to vote the portion allocable to them;
(2) the General Motors stock which Christiana held in its own name was also sterilized;
and (3) no officers or directors of duPont, Christiana or Delaware were to be allowed to
vote any General Motors stock. United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 177 F.
Supp. 1, 52 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
56 This is in sharp contrast with the position generally taken by the judiciary in the
past - i.e., an almost blanket refusal to delve into economics in detail in antitrust cases.
See, e.g., Oppenheim, Timberg & Van Cise, supra note 46, at 129; Adams, Dissolution,
Divorcement, Divestiture: The Pyrrhic Victories of Antitrust, 27 IND. L.J. 1, 35 (1951);
Barnes, supra note 7, at 588, 589. For a discussion of the problems necessitating the adoption
of an economic approach, see Dession, The Trial of Economic and Technological Issues of
Fact, 58 YALE L.J. 1019 (1949).
57 Standard Oil 'Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 77 (1910); accord, Timken Roller-
Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 604 (1950) (concurring opinion); United
States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 338, 348 (1946); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United
States, 323 U.S. 386, 409 (1944).
58 See United States v. Union Pacific R.R., 226 U.S. 470, 477 (1913); accord,
United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 189 (1944).
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There is no question but, had the court so decided, it could have ordered
duPont to effect a complete divestiture of its General Motors stock.59 Equity, how-
ever, particularly as applied to the stockholders,6" prevented such a remedy. And
dissolution, although within the power of the court, appeared to be too harsh a
remedy. 61 This is especially true since the stock transaction certainly appeared legal
at the time it was executed. In fact, it seems almost undeniable that its illegality
arose only because of the tremendous growth of General Motors and duPont. The
latter company thereby achieved the power to control some of the former's business
policies6 2 - an illegal result even if intent were lacking.
6 3
In exercising its equity powers the court also ordered that "no officer or direc-
tor of duPont, Christiana and Delaware will be permitted to serve as an officer or
director of General Motors, and General Motors will be prohibited from having as
an employee any employee of duPont, Christiana or Delaware." 65 There is no
question but that this remedy was within the equity powers of the court,65 and that
it was absolutely necessary to effectively eliminate the conditions found by the
Supreme Court to be existing.6 The failure of the Government to obtain more
stringent remedies very possibly resulted from its own inability to convince the court
59 See United States v. Southern Pacific Co., 250 U.S. 214 (1922); United States v.
Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920).
60 Under no theory can these stockholders be said to have participated in
any violation or engaged in any improper conduct. Moreover, the Govern-
ment itself cannot escape responsibility for the plight of these stockholders.
At the time of acquisition there existed a very small fraction of the present
number of stockholders of the corporations involved. It waited some thirty
years after the acquisition occurred before bringing this action. It should,
therefore, recognize that stockholders who purchased duPont in those
intervening years had every reason to believe that duPont's holding of
General Motors was entirely proper and legal.
United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 177 F. Supp. 1, 13 (1959).
The tax consequences were also so overwhelming that the court could not, in all fairness,
require a complete divestiture of the General Motors stock. And this is in keeping with the
historical policy adopted by Congress of avoiding the imposition of a tax burden on stock
transactions required by law. See, e.g., INT. Rxv. COD- of 1954, §§ 1071, 1081, 1101;
United States v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 96 F. Supp. 356, 358, (D. Mass. 1951).
Finally, the court had generous precedent to invoke in order to substantiate its order divesting
duPont only of its right to vote the General Motors stock. See, e.g., American Crystal Sugar
Co., v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524
(2d Cir. 1958); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn.
1953); Union Bag & Paper Corp., 52 F.T.C. 1278 (1956).
61 The Government may bring suit to dissolve an unlawful combination, United States
v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assoc., 166 U.S. 290 (1897); and the court has the right to decree
dissolution of such an unlawful combination, United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26
(1920); but this right rests in the discretion of the court, United States v. American Can Co.,
234 Fed. 1019 (1916); and will or will not be exercised depending on the facts of each
case, United States v. Pacific R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 470 (1913). The courts generally refuse
the Government's request for dissolution if it will not serve the public interest, United
States v. Borax Consol., 62 F. Supp. 220 (1945); or "if the industry will not need it for
its protection," United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 446 (2d Cir.
1945); or if the less severe remedy of injunction is adequate, United States v. Great Lakes
Towing Co., 217 Fed. 656 (1914). But for a denunciation of the equitable approaches
taken in similar antitrust cases, see Adams, supra note 56, at 32: "The courts . . . have
generally refrained from breaking asunder what man has illegally joined together."
62 DuPont and its affiliates owned 23% of the common stock of General Motors, a
holding which most assuredly gave it the power of control even if such power was never
exercised. See, e.g., Morgan Stanley & Co. v. SEC, 126 F.2d 325, 328 (2d Cir. 1942), a
case in which ownership of only 19.6% of the voting stock of a company was held sufficient
to maintain control.
63 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
64 United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 177 F. Supp. 1, 52 (1959).
65 See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
66 For an excellent discussion of the vast role duPont has continued to play in the
development of General Motors and the direction of many facets of General Motors' business
policies, see Dirlam & Stelzer, supra note 43. It is obvious that duPont was able to place
its officers and directors on the Board of General Motors only because of the large per-
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
of the "disastrous" results of the existing oligopolistic structure in the "lines of com-
merce" in which General Motors and duPont carried on their activities. 67
Another essential feature of the final judgment of the District Court upon re-
mand was the following:
All preferential trade arrangements or understandings between duPont
and General Motors will be cancelled, and they will be prohibited from
entering into any such arrangements or embarking on joint commercial
ventures so long as duPont owns General Motors stock. Any existing re-
quirements contracts between the two companies will be cancelled and
they will not be permitted to enter into any such contract for a period of
three years following entry of the final judgment herein, after which
period requirements contracts of not more than one year's duration will
not be prohibited. 68
Although the facts allegedly showing duPont's ability to influence the creation
of preferential trade arrangements were disputed at the hearing, this does not de-
prive the court of the right to make the above order.6 9 Furthermore, even if such
arrangements had not been made in the past, it is entirely reasonable to hold that
duPont had the power to inaugurate them.7 0 There seems to be no question, there-
fore, but that the court was correct in prohibiting preferential trade agreements.
Nor should the cancellation of existing requirements contracts be considered
an inequitable or harsh remedy. "It is axiomatic that contracts, agreements and
arrangements containing illegal features be terminated. Here, . . . the better prac-
tice is outright cancellation rather than mere reformation of existing instruments." 7 1
With this in mind, the wisdom underlying the restriction of such contracts in the
future to periods of one year's duration appears obvious. 72 It should also be kept
in mind that the court made a special provision "for a review and reconsideration
of . . . the final judgment [if] the provisions thereof should prove in the future to
centage of common stock which it controlled. Since the court allows the legal ownership of
these shares to remain with duPont and its affiliates, the elimination of the interlocking
directorate was vital if the harmful results of the vertical integration were to be prevented.
See Barnes, supra note 7, at 598-99: "It would always appear to be a reasonable probability,
approaching a per se test, that any significant stock relation between two companies would
influence competition between them." (Emphasis added.)
67 See Adams, supra note 56, at 24, 31, 34, 36.
68 United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 177 F. Supp. 1, 52 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
69 See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
70 DuPont's power rested on three factors: (1) it -owned such a large block of stock
that it could not be challenged, since the larger the corporation the smaller the percentage
of voting stock needed for effective control. See BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORA-
TION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); (2) directly connected with the ownership of stock
was the concept of vertical integration, for "one likely effect of acquiring a customer cor-
poration is to reduce a competitor's choice of customers even though the industry may re-
main unquestionably competitive." Manne, supra note 32, at 406; and (3) both duPont
and General Motors fall within that classification of concerns known as "oligopolies" -
industries where a relatively small number of large firms account for the major portion of
the total production and sales. Oppenheim, Timberg & Van Cise, supra note 46, at 125.
71 Timberg, supra note 5, at 652. (Emphasis added.) See also United States v. Stand-
ard Oil of California, 78 F. Supp. 850, 867 (S.D. Cal. 1948), aff'd, 337 U.S. 293 (1949),
where the court elaborated on this problem in some detail. For an economic argument in
favor of such contracts, see Stockhausen, The Commercial and Anti-Trust Aspects of Term
Requirements Contracts, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. 412 (1948). Restrictions contracts are certainly
analogous to "exclusive dealing" contracts, which have generally been held violative of the
principles of the antitrust acts where they have an appreciable impact on the competitive
market. See, e.g., FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953);
Standard Oil of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); United States v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948);
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298
U.S. 131 (1936).
72 "A purchase control plan merely does directly what divestiture is designed to do
indirectly, viz., create equal opportunity for Dupont's competitors." 12 Sw.L.J. 128, 132 (1958).
But query, (1) whether General Motors will be able to purchase the same high quality
goods as were provided by duPont, and (2) whether a provision allowing requirements con-
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be inadequate to curb the violation, and in the event of [a] ... change in tax
policy." 7 3
The equitable remedies contained in the final judgment of the District Court
seem eminently practical even though not so extensive as the Government requested.
But the real problem arises when one considers the extent to which the duPont deci-
sion might be applied in subsequent antitrust litigation. It could either be confined
to its peculiar facts, or extended to cover numerous corporate mergers.7 4 And the
possible scope of the decision will certainly depend on whether it is expanded to
include cases of internal growth.7 5 Nevertheless, the better approach would seem
to be to limit the case to its peculiar facts. It seems highly unlikely that the Gov-
ernment, not being faced with a situation involving two oligopolies of the size of
General Motors and duPont, with their interlocking directorates, their percentage
of stock holdings, extensive requirements contracts, and alleged preferential trade
arrangements, would invoke an antitrust action. Consequently, the worst that can
be said of the Supreme Court's interpretation of duPont's stock acquisition is that
the Court twisted the fibers of section 7 in order to find illegitimacy in the face of
an apparently legal birth certificate. The best that can be said is that the Supreme
Court found that duPont had engaged in a speculative venture that had had enor-
mous success; but that it must now discontinue reaping many of its financial re-
wards because its continued interest in General Motors constitutes a probable harm-
ful effect on the relevant market. Since the truth probably lies somewhere in be-
tween, it must be said of the District Court that it demonstrated erudition and
judicial restraint in exercising its discretionary equity power in so efficacious a man-
ner. As a result, neither the Government, duPont, nor the latter's stockholders
should be heard to complain. John C. Hirsch feld
tracts for one year periods is not a continuation of the same evil found to exist, since General
Motors can still purchase the greater percentage of its requirements from duPont, even
though this be limited to a year-by-year basis?
73 United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 177 F. Supp. 1, 52 (N.D. III. 1959).
As to the rationale for this approach, see Timberg, supra note 5, at 656-57:
Although the practice has been to respect the finality of judgments, it is
arguable that the reser~ed jurisdiction of the court may be resorted to by
the Government any time that the basic purposes of a judgment are being
frustrated .... Frequently, . .. the defendants present an economic justi-
fication for less far-reaching relief than the Department may have asked
for . . . - a justification which the Government is willing to test (without
acquiesence) in the light of operations under the judgment.
74 Prior to the amendment to section 7 in 1950, a corporation could avoid that section
by acquiring the assets of a company after purchasing its stock. Thatcher Manufacturing Co.
v. FTC, 272 U.S. 554, 561 (1926). Nor would section 7 apply even if the assets were
purchased after the Government brought action on the illegal stock transaction. Arrow-
Hart & Hegeman Electric Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934). This was remedied by the
1950 amendment to section 7. Yet, because acquisitions of assets prior to the 1950 amend-
ment are not subject to it (since it is not retroactive in effect), and because many stock
acquisitions were immediately followed by asset acquisitions to take advantage of the above
two decisions, many corporations appear to be safe from the duPont decision. If the courts
continue to oppose monopolistic tendencies, however, it would be possible for the Government,
by a judicial reinterpretation of the Thatcher and Arrow-Hart decisions, to reach those
acquisitions that fell within the rules of these two cases. The fact that the decisions in
both cases were 5 to 4 renders this approach very probable. Cf., Stigler, Mergers and Pre-
ventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. Rnv. 176, 177 (1955).
75 For an argument that the duPont decision should be limited solely to cases of ex-
ternal growth, see Baldridge, The Present Status of Large Corporations under Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 25, 30 (1958).
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ATTORNEYS GENERAL - DISCIPLINARY POWERS OF THE COURT - ATTORNEY
GENERAL SUBJECT TO DISCIPLINARY POWERS OF COURT - The Supreme Court of
Minnesota issued a temporary writ directing certain counties to refrain from adopt-
ing any order or resolution establishing daylight saving time or putting into effect
any such order or resolution already adopted. Shortly after the writ was issued, the
state Attorney General, who was assisting the attorneys for the counties involved,
appeared on radio and television and stated that the court had no right to issue such
an order, and that the counties concerned could legally establish daylight saving
time. The Supreme Court issued a citation to the Attorney General directing him
to appear before the court and explain or deny the statements. Acting upon the
advice of the Governor, the Attorney General declined to appear. The court then
instituted an original proceeding to investigate his professional conduct. Held, per
curiam: censure ordered. When the Attorney General appears before the court in
a legal matter, he is an officer of the court and as such subject to its disciplinary
powers. In re Lord, 97 N.W.2d 287 (Minn. 1959).
Historically the courts have had the power to summarily punish attorneys for
acts of professional misconduct.' The basis of this summary jurisdiction is said to
be found in the fact that an attorney is an officer of the court and as such is subject
to the inherent power of the courts to discipline its officers. 2 Formerly, the sanction
imposed under this general power included disbarment by pitching the offender
over an iron bar fortified with spikes.3 Today, however, the generally imposed sanc-
tions are limited to censure, suspension, and a more restrained type of disbarment.
It is important to distinguish the court's summary jurisdiction over an attorney
for professional misbehavior from its jurisdiction to punish summarily for contempt.
The two are distinct and "proceed upon very different grounds." 4 A contempt pro-
ceeding is essentially criminal in nature while a disciplinary proceeding is not re-
garded as being a criminal inquiry.5 The latter addresses itself solely to the attor-
ney's continued fitness to practice law.6 It is often said that the function of a
disciplinary proceeding is to preserve the courts "from the officious ministrations
of persons unfit to practice in them." 7
There is little doubt that a state supreme court has the power, in the exercise
of its supervisory jurisdiction over the legal profession, to discipline an attorney who
advises a client to disregard a temporary order of the court. The very least that
could be said about such conduct is that it is a breach of professional ethics8 and
impairs the due and orderly administration of justice. Presumably the Attorney
General, as the attorney of the body politic, is bound by the same standards of ethi-
cal conduct prescribed for other attorneys.9 However, it does not necessarily follow
that the Attorney General is subject to the disciplinary powers of the court, as is a
private attorney, when he misbehaves professionally.
Indeed the only question really presented by the instant case is whether the
court has jurisdiction over the professional conduct of the Attorney General. This
is a point which apparently has never been decided by any American court prior to
the instant decision.
1 Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866); People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin,
248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928).
2 See Ex parte Garland supra note 1; see generally 2 THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW
§§ 756-72 (1914).
3 ORKIN, LEGAL ETHICS 195 (1957).
4 Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 520 (1873).
5 E.g., In re Rieg, 131 N.J.L. 559, 37 A.2d 417 (1944). But see Buhler v. Frick, 195
Ind. 190, 144 N.E. 840 (1924) where it was held that disbarment actions are penal in nature.
6 E.g., Bar Association of City of Boston v. Casey, 211 Mass. 187, 97 N.E. 751 (1912).
7 Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288 (1882).
8 See DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 152 (1953); NEw YORK COUNTY LAWYERS' ASSOCIA-
TION, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Opinion 262 (1928).
9 Cf. ABA, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES,
Opinion 199 (1957).
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Two factors complicate the issue. First, in nearly all states the Attorney General
is an elected official. Is it within the purview of courts or is it for the electorate to
determine the fitness of the Attorney General to discharge the duties of his office?
Secondly, in all states the Attorney General is a key part of the executive branch
of government.10 Does a court, by exercising jurisdiction over his professional con-
duct, subvert the separation of powers?
The instant court did not consider the first point. It did, however, deal with
the separation of powers question. In fact, the court, with some ingenuity, used the
doctrine to justify its exercise of jurisdiction over the Attorney General.
The court maintained that, although the Attorney General is a member of the
executive branch, as an attorney he is also an officer of the court. When he appears
before the court in a legal matter he appears as an attorney and in no other capacity.
The court contended that to hold that the Attorney General, when he appears be-
fore it, is not subject to the same ethical standards prescribed for other attorneys
and that the court is without power to discipline him for misconduct would "reduce
the court to a tool of the executive." The court further contended that to permit
the governor to interfere with the disciplinary power of the court over the Attorney
General when he appears in court would destroy the separation of powers.
It is interesting to note that the Attorney General used the same separation of
powers doctrine to deny that the court had jurisdiction over him. In a letter to
the governor 1 ' he stated that for him to submit to the courts' compulsory process
would seriously impair the independence of the executive branch. He maintained
that to "consent to the courts' jurisdiction in this matter would be to deny that we
are a government of separate, co-equal and independent branches."
Putting aside the separation of powers doctrine and turning to the court's con-
tention that the Attorney General is an officer of the court, we find that this claim
is without historical support. The office of Attorney General, as well as the concept
that the attorney is an officer of the court, has its origin in English history. The
Attorney General emerged in seventeenth-century England as the chief law officer
of the Crown.12 He appeared for the Crown in all courts in any matter, civil or
criminal, in which the Crown had an interest.' 3 Because it was his duty to speak
for the rights, interests and prerogatives of the Crown, he enjoyed certain powers
and privileges which the ordinary attorney did not possess.'4 Chroust states:
[-J]nlike the common attorney, he was not really an officer of the court
since he was not admitted to practice by the court. ... Neither was he
under the disciplinary supervision of the court. The gradual development
of the special powers and prerogatives of the King's attorney progressively
distinguished him from the ordinary attorney to the extent that by the
seventeenth century his office had a unique character hardly reminiscent
of the old attornatus.'5
From the outset, the American colonies adopted the office of Attorney General
as it existed in England.'6 Today it is well established that the state attorneys
general have all of the duties, powers and prerogatives of their English predeces-
10 MINN. CoNsT. art. V, § l . "The executive department shall consist of . . . an
attorney general, who shall be chosen by the electors of the state."
11 Letter from Miles Lord to Orville L. Freeman, May 26, 1959.
12 For authoritative historical studies of the office of Attorney General see: PLUCKNETT,
A CONcIsE IISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 228-230 (5th ed. 1956); POUND, THE LAWYER
FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN Txh-s 111-18 (1953); Bellot, Origin of the Attorney General,
25 L.Q. REv. 400 (1909); Cooley, Predecessors of the Federal Attorney General In England
and the American Colonies, 2 Am J. LEGAL HIST. 304 (1958); Holdsworth, The Early History
of the Attorney and Solicitor General, 13 ILL. L. REv. 602 (1919).
13 See material cited supra note 12.
14 See generally 6 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 458-81 (2d ed. 1937).
15 Chroust, The Ranks of the Legal Profession In England. To appear in 11 W. REs.
L. Rzv. (Spring 1960); accord, 6 HOLDSWORTr, supra note 12, at 613.
16 See generally Cooley, supra note 12.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
sors.'T However, as previously mentioned, only the instant court has passed on the
question whether they have inherited their predecessors' immunity from the disci-
plinary.powers of the court.
The instant court stated that in order to prevent repetitions of the condemned
conduct, it will retain jurisdiction over the matter for three years. By retaining jur-
isdiction the court suggests that its jurisdiction extends to more than a censure. This
raises an interesting question. Assuming that a state supreme court does have juris-
diction over the Attorney General's professional conduct, how far can it go in dis-
ciplining him? Could it suspend or disbar him?
The answer to this question would probably depend on whether the Attorney
General is required to be a licensed attorney.' 8 If the state constitution requires him
to be a licensed attorney,' 9 then disbarment or suspension would appear to disqualify
him from office.20 This might be challenged as unconstitutional, 21 since, removal of
the Attorney General from office is provided for by the constitution in most if not
all states.22 Possibly a court in such a state could disbar him but recognize his ca-
pacity to perform any administrative functions incident to his office.3 Further, could
a court, after disbarring the Attorney General, rightfully refuse to hear him if he
appears before it as the legal representative of the state? At best, this appears ques-
tionable, since the Attorney General's warrant to represent the sovereign in its courts
is conferred by virtue of his office rather than by license from the court.
The position taken by the Attorney General and the one taken by the court
represent two extreme views. Neither seems very realistic. To say that the courts
have no control over the Attorney General's conduct when he appears before them
would expose the courts to public ridicule and subject them to the danger of be-
coming a tool of the executive. On the other hand, to have an Attorney General
who is subservient to the courts would not be in the public interest. An acceptable
solution would be to give the court a limited jurisdiction for the purpose of censur-
ing an Attorney General whose conduct before the court is unethical or extremely
indiscreet. No real disruption of the separation of powers would result and the
court would maintain its judicial dignity. Without special constitutional provision,
any further disciplinary powers affecting the conduct of an executive office would
be an usurpation of a right reserved to the people. Thomas Kavadas, Jr.
17 E.g., Darling Apartment Co. v. Springer, 25 Del. Ch. 420, 22 A.2d 397 (1941);
Kennington-Saenger Theatres v. State, 196 Miss. 841, 18 So.2d 483 (1944).
18 There is no requirement in the Minnesota Constitution that the Attorney General be
an attorney or licensed to practice law. But see People v. Munson, 319 Ill. 596, 150 N.E.
280 (1925) where it was held that a prosecuting attorney must be licensed to practice law
although the constitution did not require it.
19 CoLo. CONST. art. IV, § 4: "No person shall be eligible to the office of... attorney-
general unless he . . . be a licensed attorney of the supreme court of the state." LA. CONST.
art, 7, § 56: "The Attorney General . . . shall be learned in the law." See Danford v. Egan,
23 S.D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021 (1909) where a similar provision precluded a disbarred attorney
from holding the office of prosecuting attorney.
20 Cf. State ex. rel. Saxbe v. Franko, 168 Ohio St. 338, 154 N.E. 751 (1958) where a
statute requiring that a municipal judge "shall have been admitted to the practice of law
in this state" was interpreted to require a maintenance of his privilege to practice law. This
is distinguishable, however, since the judge's duties are wholly judicial as compared with the
primarily administrative duties of the Attorney General.
21 This contention was rejected when made by a prosecuting attorney in Commonwealth
ex. rel. Pike County Bar Ass'n. v. Stump, 247 Ky. 587, 57 S.W.2d 524 (1924).
22 See, e.g., Mo. CONST. art. 7, § 1: "All elective executive officials of the state,.
shall be liable to impeachment for crimes, misconduct, drunkenness, . . . corruption in office,
incompetency . . .;" art. 2 "The house of representatives shall have the sole power of im-
peachment."
23 An attorney who had been suspended for one year was specifically allowed to serve
as a prosecuting attorney after being elected to the office in McGehee v. State, 182 Ark.
1024, 33 S.W.2d 368 (1930).
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CHARITABLE TRUSTS - CY PRES - Dor NE HELD INAPPLICABLE TO BE-
QUEST TO MUNICIPALITY FOR RACIALLY RESTRICTED PLAYFIELD - Decedent made
a testamentary bequest of the residue of her estate to the city of Detroit for the
establishment of a playground for white children. The will stipulated that its pro-
visions were "to be carried out to the letter." No provision was made for gift over
in the event of the failure of the condition. The lower court held the bequest in-
valid as violative of the fourteenth amendment. On appeal, held, affirmed by an
evenly divided court. The affirming opinion held that the requirement in the will
that its provisions were "to be carried out to the letter" precluded application of
the cy pres doctrine. The remainder of the court voted to permit the city to accept
the gift by construing the bequest, cy pres, for the benefit of all the children of
Detroit. LaFond v. City of Detroit, 98 N.W.2d 530 (Mich. 1959).
The American Law Institute has expressed what is generally conceded to be
a fair working definition of the cy pres doctrine:"
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable- purpose,
and if it is or becomes impossible or impractical or illegal to carry out the
particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more general intention
to devote. the property to charitable purposes, the trust will not fail but
the court will direct the application of the property to some charitable
purpose which falls within the general charitable intention of the settlor.2
The history of the cy pres doctrine has been checkered with extremes of judicial
favor. Though perhaps its origin can be traced to early Roman times,3 it received
its English birth under the medieval ecclesiastical chancellors. The theory was that,
since it was the donor's intent to receive higher approval in the hereafter, this desire
should not be frustrated by taking the property from charitable uses. To preserve
these expiatory bequests, the doctrine developed a double character, judicial and
prerogative cy pres. The former is merely a construction of the testator's intent "as
near as possible" (from Norman French, cy pres comme possible), while the latter,
exercised parens patriae, often flew in the face of the testator's express intention.
The blurring of the two forms caused even the judicial form of the doctrine to be
rejected in early American jurisprudence. However, by statute and decision it gradu-
ally returned to favor.4
Traditionally there have been three prerequisites to the sustaining of a char-
itable bequest by the application of cy pres, namely, a charitable trust, a general
charitable intent, and impossibility, impracticability or illegality of carrying out the
terms of the donor's specific purpose.3 Although there has been a general liberali-
zation of these requirements, they still must be present to warrant invocation of the
cy pres doctrine.6
The courts have generally experienced little difficulty in finding a charitable
trust. It would seem that any gift to a charitable organization is given subject to a
trust, or "a gift in trust will be implied." 7
1 See, e.g., Estate of Clippinger, 75 Cal. App. 2d 426, 171 P.2d 567 (2d Dist. Ct. App.
1946); First Nat'l Bank v. Elliot, 406 Ill. 44, 92 N.E.2d 446 (1950); Petition of Rochester
Trust Co., 94 N.H. 207, 49 A.2d 922 (1946).
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRuSTS § 399 (1959). The wording is identical to the
original version of 1935 which received such wide judicial approval.
3 Church of Latter Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
4 FiscH, TH- Cy PRES DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES 2-124 (1950).
5 FIsCH, Id. at 128.
6 Fisch, Changing Concepts and Cy Pres, 44 CORNELL L. Q. 382 (1959).
7 In re Walter's Estate, 269 N.Y.S. 402, 405 (Surr. Ct. 1934); accord, Estate of
Clippinger, 75 Cal. App. 2d 426, 171 P.2d 567, 572 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1946), wherein the
Court said "a devise to a society organized for charitable purposes without a declaration of
ithe use to which the gift is to be put is given in trust to carry out the objects for which
the organization was created." But see In re Lowe's Estate 117 Ind. App. 554, 70 N.E.2d
187 (1946), wherein there is broad language to the effect that a gift to a charitable institu-
tion with no terms of trust is an outright gift to which cy pres is not applicable.
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The requirement of a general charitable intent is the problem with which the
courts most frequently have to wrestle. In O'Hara v. Grand Lodge I.O.G.T. can
be found expression of the sentiments of many courts on this prerequisite: "In de-
termining whether there has been expressed a general charitable intent, the trust
instrument is always construed most strongly against the trustor, for the reason that
the courts favor charities." 8 Factors usually considered to find a general charitable
intent are a provision for distribution of the entire residue of the estate to various
charities, and the absence of a provision for gift over in the event of the failure of
the condition.9 The fact that the donor requires a memorial to himself or another
does not usually indicate a lack of charitable intent.10
In order for cy pres to be applicable, there must be a failure only of the par-
ticular means for effectuating the testator's more general intent." "1 Related to this
is the question of whether the purpose specified admits of a more general intention.
In Hampton v. O'Rear the court determined that the settlor had "intended to part
with title to the property devised in the event only that such property should be
used for a particular purpose and in a particular manner by a particular person." 12
This conclusion was reached by reading the entire will which contained such phrases
as "strict adherence to and compliance with these provisions... and not otherwise."
However, although the specified purpose may be quite limited it may be suf-
ficiently general to satisfy this requirement. In Fay v. Hunster" the settlor left
money insufficient to establish a home for aged colored people which was to be
under the direction of the pastor of a named church. The court held that there was
evidenced a charitable intent to aid aged colored people and the establishment of
the home was only the way to effect this. Therefore, the trust should be applied cy
pres to other such institutions.
The third requirement is that of impossibility, impracticality or illegality of
the donor's method of carrying out his general intent.' The situations this encom-
passes are legion: the trustee may refuse the gift; 5 the named institution may no
longer be or never have been in existence;' 6 the trust may be insufficient for the plan
proposed;' 7 changed condition may make it impractical to carry out the plan.' In
all of the above instances the court distributed the trust cy pres to effectuate the
8 213 Cal. 131, 141, 2 P.2d 21, 25 (1931); accord, Union Methodist Episcopal Church
v. Equitable Trust Co., 32 Del. Oh. 197, 83 A.2d 111, 114 (1951); 31 ST. JOHN's L. REv.
271 (1957).
9 Town of Brookline v. Barnes, 324 Mass. 632, 87 N.E.2d 843 (1949).
10 Noel v. Olds, 138 F.2d 581, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1943); In re Loring's Estate, 29 Cal.2d
423, 175 P.2d 524 (1946).
11 FiscH, supra note 4 at 128.
12 309 Ky. 1, 215 S.W.2d 539, 543 (1948); accord, Defenders of Furbearers v. First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 306 S.W.2d 100 (Ky. 1957); Banker's Trust Co. v. New York
Women's League for Animals, 23 N.J. Super. 170, 92 A.2d 820 (1952).
13 181 F.2d 289 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Accord, Olds v. Rollins College, 173 F.2d 639
(D.C. Cir. 1949) (a gift of an art museum was refused by Duke University. Held, testator
had general intent to promote culture in the South; the establishment at Duke was only
specific interest). See Stead v. American Security & Trust Co., 173 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.
1949) (per curiam); Petition of Rochester Trust Co., 94 N.H. 207, 49 A.2d 922 (1946).
14 First Nat'l Bank v. Elliot, 406 Ill. 44, 92 N.E.2d 446 (1950).
15 In re Faukner's Estate, 128 Cal. App. 2d 575, 275 P.2d 818 (1st Dist. Ct. App.
1954) (a gift to A.A. was refused as a matter of policy. Gift indicated a general intent to
help alcoholics so court will name new trustee). Olds v. Rollins College, 173 F.2d 639
(D.C. Cir. 1949).
16 Petition of Rochester Trust Co., 94 N.H. 207, 49 A.2d 922 (1946). (There was no
specifically Protestant charitable institution in named town); In re Clark's Will, 150 N.Y.S.2d
65 (Surr. Ct. 1956) (Named church had ceased to exist as a separate entity but had merged
with another).
17 Fay v. Hunster, 181 F.2d 289 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (not sufficient money to establish a
home for aged).
18 Stead v. American Security & Trust Co., 173 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (per curiam);
Shoemaker v. American Security Charity & Trust Co., 163 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
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settlor's dominant intention. One situation where cy pres has no application is that
in which the testator provided for failure of his original plan by gift over. 9 The
expressed intent of the donor in regard to the alternative beneficiary obviates the
need for the use of cy pres. 20
The instant case provided only two of the three prerequisites for the proper ap-
plication of cy pres. Both opinions assumed without discussion that the bequest was
a charitable trust. Neither opinion denied that a strict adherence to the specific
condition would have been improper state action in contravention to the fourteenth
amendment. Apparently there was no attempt to avoid the illegality of the condi-
tion as was done in In re Girard College Trusteeship,21 by use of cy pres to replace
the municipal trustee with a private trustee. Neither opinion considered this ap-
proach, possibly because the bequest had already been declared invalid by a lower
court.22 It has been suggested that such action on the part of a court would of itself
constitute improper state action.
23
It was the general charitable intent that was found lacking in the instant case.
Usually implicit in these cases, but at times explicit, is the realization that in the
exercise of judicial cy pres the courts are to carry out the intention of the settlor.
As a rule of judicial construction, cy pres "is an aid to fulfill a testator's design as
nearly as possible."24 Therefore,
A court of equity is not warranted in substituting a different plan for that
which the testatrix primarily prescribed in the instrument creating this
charitable trust, merely because a coldly wise intelligence, impervious to the
special predilections which inspired her liberality, and indifferent to her
final word as to the disposition of her property, would have dictated a dif-
ferent use of her money.25
Those who sought to overturn the lower court decision by the use of cy pres would
seem to overlook this canon of equity jurisprudence. The testatrix intended to aid
only children of the white race. Any other "construction" is merely substituting the
"constructor's" desires for those of the donor whose property and generosity are
involved. The result reached by a literal interpretation of the donor's command
that the provisions were "to be carried out to the letter" does less violence to the
donor's intention than would an enlarged class of beneficiaries. Though the guaran-
tee of civil rights to all citizens is a most important function of the courts, this
policy should not permit a court to override the intention of the testator in the dis-
position of his property. The approach favored by the dissent would result in the
predilections of the judge prevailing over the generous intent of the testator and the
introduction into our jurisprudence of the detested prerogative cy pres which has
been rightly left to the British Crown.
26
Thomas A. McNish
19 First Nat'l Bank v. American Bd. of Comm'rs for Foreign Missions, 328 Ill. App. 481,
66 N.E.2d 446 (1946); City of Belfast v. Goodwill Farms, 103 A.2d 517 (Me. 1954).
20 Camden Trust Co. v. Christ's Home, 28 N.J. Super. 446, 101 A.2d 84 (1953);
In re Shapiro, 112 N.Y.S.2d 46 (Surr. Ct. 1952).
21 In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844, cert. denied, 357 U.S.
570 (1958).
22 28 U.S.L. WEEK 1061 (Nov. 3, 1959). Also, it is questionable whether it would be
practicable to appoint a private trustee to administer a playfield.
23 In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844, 854 (1958) (dis-
senting opinion); 33 Notre Dame Law. 495 (1958).
24 In re Clark's Will, 150 N.Y.S.2d 65, 68 (Surr. Ct. 1956); accord, Residents &
Fellows of Harvard College v. Jewett, 11 F.2d 119, 122 (6th Cir. 1925).
25 In re Price's Will, 35 N.Y.S.2d 111, 117 (Sup. Ct. 3d Dept. App. Div. 1942),
aff'd per curiam 289 N.Y. 751, 46 N.E.2d 354 (1943); accord, Union Methodist Episcopal
Church v. Equitable Trust Co., 32 Del. Ch. 197, 83 A.2d 111, 114 (1951); In re Women's
Homoeopathic Hospital, 393 Pa. 313, 142 A.2d 292, 294 (1958).
26 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 399.1 (1956).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - COURTS- MARTIAL - CIVILIAN DEPENDENTS AND
EMPLOYEES NOT SUBJECT TO MILITARY JURISDICTION. - On January 18, 1960 the
United States Supreme Court decided four cases which gave a final and authori-
tative answer to the question, may civilians be court-martialed in peacetime? In
1957, it was decided in Reid v. Covert" that servicemen's wives could not be court-
martialed for capital offenses committed abroad. One of the cases concerned a
serviceman's wife who was court-martialed for a noncapital offense committed
while accompanying her husband overseas. Three other cases involved capital and
noncapital offenses cormmitted by civilian employees of the armed forces while over-
seas. Held, the necessary and proper clause cannot expand the power given Con-
gress to regulate the land and naval forces so as to include civilian dependents who
have committed noncapital crimes, Kinsella v. Singleton, 80 Sup. Ct. 297 (1960),
or civilian employees who have committed capital crimes, Grisham v. Hagan, 80
Sup. Ct. 310 (1960), or noncapital crimes in peacetime while abroad with the
armed forces, McElroy v. Guagliardo, 80 Sup. Ct. 305 (1960).
Congress, in May of 1950, enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice2
(UCMJ), accomplishing a badly needed reform.3 Especially significant among the
many changes was the establishment of the Court of Military Appeals composed of
three civilian judges.4 While most would agree with Mr. Justice Black that trial by
court-martial lacks the advantages of trial by jury,5 the same cannot be said about
the procedural safeguards insured by the Code. The pre-trial investigatory proceed-
ings are noteworthy.6 It might even be argued that military appellate review pos-
sesses many advantages which are lacking in the civil system. Among its more de-
sirable features are automatic review at no cost to the accused,' competent counsel
furnished without charge,8 the possibility of defendant procuring his own civilian
counsel,0 and an extensive review of court-martial findings and sentences.'0
But Americans are distrustful, if not fearful, of military authority and have
therefore turned to the federal civil courts when faced with the exercise of military
jurisdiction." Past history has demonstrated that petitions for writs of habeas corpus
have given rise to most of the important cases concerning military jurisdiction.'2
Because a court-martial is not a part of the federal judiciary the federal courts can-
1 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
2 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-76 (1959). Morgan, The Background of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 6 VAND. L. REV. 169 (1953).
3 "Probably no one will deny that the court-martial law under which appellant was
convicted needed reformation; indeed this has already been accomplished [by UCMJ.]"
White v. Humphrey, 212 F.2d 503, 507-8 (3d Cir. 1954); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137,
140-41 (1953). Snedeker, The Uniform Code of Military justice, 38 GEo. L.J. 521, 524-56
(1950), contains an analysis of the "ailments of military justice" prior to the Code.
4 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 67(a), 10 U.S.C. § 867(a) (1959); Shaw v.
United States, 209 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
5 Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17-19 (1955); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 36-39 (1957);
Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 234 (1959).
6 Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 30-35, 10 U.S.C. §§ 830-5 (1959).
7 EVERETT, MILITARY JUSTICE 306 (1956).
8 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 70(c), 10 U.S.C. § 870(c) (1959).
9 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 70(d), 10 U.S.C. § 870(d) (1959).
10 Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 59-76, 10 U.S.C. § 859-76 (1959).
11 Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144 (No. 9487) (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (a courageous
stand taken'by Chief Justice Taney against the exercise of military jurisdiction); Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2 (1866) (a "state paper" in this field holding that if a civil
court is "open," a civilian citizen cannot be made subject to military jurisdiction). Duncan
v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228 (1959).
12 Ibid.
13 Jackson v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 509 (1957); Fowler v. Wilkinson, 353 U.S, 583 (1957);
Burns v. Wilson; 346 U.S. 137 (1953); WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 30-2
(2d Ed. 1920). ". . . neither mandamus, certiorari, nor a writ of prohibition is available."
Snedeker, The Uniform Code of Military justice, 38 GEo. L.J. 521, 532 (1950).
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not directly review its actions.'3 But a collateral attack may be allowed, especially
when military jurisdiction is challenged. 14
Articles (2) and (3) of the UCMJ classify the persons subject to the Code.'5
If the exercise of jurisdiction is justified by the statute the more difficult question
of constitutional power is reached.' 6
When does a civilian become a member of the armed forces? Under existing
law, induction causes the crucial transformation. Although the Supreme Court had
indicated 7 that if an individual failed to report for induction he could be court-
martialed, Congress in article 2(1) of the UCMJ established "actual induction"
as the changing point.'8 Volunteers, however, are transformed at the time of their
"muster or acceptance" into the armed forces.' 9
But the termination of military status, or the point when a soldier again returns
to civilian status, has caused more difficulty. One of the prisoners of war of the
Korean conflict who at first refused repatriation was court-martialed when he fin-
ally returned to the United States. He challenged the exercise of military jurisdic-
tion, claiming he should have been discharged from the armed forces before his
court-martial. His claim was rejected by two federal courts which pointed out that
the Code in unambiguous terms reaches "those who are awaiting discharge after
expiration of enlistment." 20 Actual discharge, then, would seem to be the act that
transforms a soldier into a civilian.
But Congress did not stop at this point in granting military jurisdiction. Article
3 (a) of the UCMJ provides that anyone accused of having committed a serious
offense while subject to the UCMJ remains triable by court-martial after the ter-
mination of that status, but only if he could not be tried in a civil court.21 In 1955
14 WINTHROP, Op. cit. at 49-50. For the beginning of the evolution of a new method
of challenging military authority see Girard v. Wilson, 152 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C.), reversed
on other grounds, 3.54 U.S. 524- (1957); Jackson v. Mc Elroy, 163 F. Supp. 257, 259 (D.D.C.
1958) where it is stated: "It will be assumed not only that the question of jurisdiction may
be inquired into but that it should be done in this declaratory judgement proceeding." For
the old view see: Hooper v. Hartman, 163 F. Supp. 437 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
15 10 U.S.C. §§ 802-03 (1959).
16 In addition to Congress' power "to make rules for the government and regulation of
the land and naval forces" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14, clauses 10, 11 and 12 are also
cited to justify congressional action.
17 Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542, 556, (1944).
18 The Court of Military Appeals had held that a person must take an oath beforejurisdiction attaches. United States v. Ornelas, 2 USCMA 96, 6 OMR 96 (1952).
19 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 2(1), 10 U.S.C. § 802(1) (1959).
20 Dickenson v. Davis, 143 F. Supp. 421 (D. Kans.), affirmed, 245 F.2d 317, (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 918 (1958). But dictum indicated that "unreasonable delay in
granting the discharge could, in all probability be made the basis for appropriate court
action." 143 F. Supp. at 425.
21 One author has effectively summarized the legislative history of Art. 3(a) Uniform
*Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 803 (a) in the following passage:
Hirshberg v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949) was the case Congress seems
to have had particularly in mind when it enacted Art. 3(a) of the Uniform
Code. Hirshberg, a Navy enlisted man, had been" a Japanese prisoner of
war during World War II. After his liberation his normal term of enlist-
ment expired and he re-enlisted the next day. Later he was court-martialed
for maltreatment of other prisoners of war. After habeas corpus proceedings
had been instituted to test military jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held
that under the applicable statutes the discharge made Hirshberg immune
from court-martial for crimes committed during his first enlistment. See
House Report No. 491, 81st Congress, Ist Session, Hearings before the
House Committee on Armed Forces, HR 4080, p. 5. In the same context
the Report refers to the larceny by American personnel of the crown
jewels of Hesse. One of the participants was a WAG Captain who was
apprehended while in terminal leave status. A Federal court decided that
while in this status she remained subject to military jurisdiction. Hironimus
v. Durant, 168 F.2d 388 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 335 U.S. 818 (1948).
EVERETT, MILITARY JUSTICE 35 n. 51 (1956).
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this article came under the fire of the federal judiciary in Toth v. Quarles.2"
Toth, a discharged airman, had been arrested in Pittsburgh, transported to
Korea, and charged with a murder allegedly committed while he was a member of
the armed forces. A discharged serviceman, said the Supreme Court, was a civilian,
and therefore entitled to trial by jury in an article III constitutional court, with
the full protection of the fifth and sixth amendments. Congress had acted outside
of its constitutional power in exercising military jurisdiction over a person in Toth's
position.23
Closely related to the regular component of our armed forces are the reserves
of the various services. Under article 2(1,3) of the UCMJ only those reserves
on active duty, or those in training who voluntarily accept orders specifying that
they are subject to the Code are amenable to military jurisdiction. Under certain
limited circumstances reservists can be ordered to active duty and would then be-
come subject to military law. For example, it has been held that a Marine reservist
ordered to active duty after failing to fulfill his reserve obligation could be taken
into custody by military authorities. 24
Article 2(11) contains what has proven to be the most controversial exercise
of military jurisdiction.25 It provides that any person "serving with, accompanying,
or employed by" the armed forces outside the United States, is amenable to military
jurisdiction. This article has also been challenged in the federal courts. When a
case concerning the "accompanying" provision first reached the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia it finessed the problem by sending the case back for the
compilation of a more comprehensive record. 28 But in a case involving a service-
man's wife who had been court-martialed for the alleged murder of her husband
while in England, Judge Tamm faced the issue squarely with the resounding ob-
servation that "a civilian is entitled to a civilian trial." 27 A different district court
disagreed and the two cases reached the Supreme Court.2 At first, the exercise of
military jurisdiction was approved on the strength of previous opinions which
seemed to indicate that the Constitution was not applicable outside the jurisdiction
of the United States, 29 but a rehearing was later ordered. The previous opinions
were withdrawn and the petitioners were ordered released.30 Mr. Justice Black, in
a forceful opinion for four Justices,5 1 rejected the notion that the protection of the
Constitution did not apply outside the territorial limits of the United States.32 The
claim that the exercise of military jurisdiction was necessary and proper to carry
22 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
23 But Art. 3(a) still seems to have some life. An airman released from active duty and
transferred to a reserve status for completion of his military obligation was found subject
to military jurisdiction. In Wheeler v. Reynolds, 164 F. Supp. 951, 955 (N.D. Fla. 1958) the
court felt that, unlike Toth, petitioner "was not a full-fledge civilian, nor in the same status as a
discharged veteran." A soldier who was- discharged and immediately re-enlisted the next
day was found amenable to military jurisdiction for an offense committeed prior to the
discharge. United States v. Kish, 176 F. Supp. 820 (M.D. Pa. 1959). The Court of Military
Appeals has taken similar positions in several cases. See United States v. Wheeler,
10 USCMA 646, 28 CMR 212 (1959) and cases cited therein.
24 In re La Plata, 174 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Mich. 1959). A National Guardsman who
consented to go on active duty with the army, received the approval of the state governor,
and accepted orders, was found amenable to court-martial jurisdiction for an offense com-
mitted while on active duty. In re Taylor, 160 F. Supp. 932 (W.D. Mo. 1958). And a
retired Admiral could be court-martialed for what also appeared to be a civilian offense: sodomy.
Hooper v. Hartman, 163 F. Supp. 437 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
25 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 2(11), 10 USC § 802(11) (1959).
26 Rubenstein v. Wilson, 212 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
27 Covert v. Reid, D.D.C., Nov. 22, 1955 cited in In re Varney, 141 F. Supp. 190, 203(S.D. Cal. 1956).
28 Krueger v. Kinsella, 137 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.W. Va. 1956).
29 Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956); Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956).
30 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
31 Id. at 3-41.
32 Id. at 5-6.
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out our executive agreements with England and Japan was also rejected. 8 The
question of congressional power was then reached: did the power to "make rules
for the government of the land and naval forces" supplemented by the necessary
and proper clause permit the exercise of military jurisdiction over civilians? The
nub of the opinion is contained in the following portion:'
Every extension of military jurisdiction is an encroachment on the juris-
diction of the civil courts, and, more important, acts as a deprivation of
the right to jury trial and other treasured constitutional protections. Having
rum up against the steadfast bulwark of the Bill of Rights, the Necessary
and Proper Clause cannot extend the Scope of Clause 14.
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan limited their concurrences to the proposition that
in capital cases during peacetime the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction could not
be justified by congressional power, when considered in connection with the specific
protections of article III, and the fifth and sixth amendments~as Their opinions
seemed to indicate a broader possible sweep for the necessary and proper clause
and an indication that the question was akin to a due process determination calling
for a balancing of many factors. For the second time, however, a portion of the
UCMJ had been declared unconstitutional.
The "employed by" portion of article 2(11) has generated even more contro-
versy. Since Covert the federal courts have had to decide several cases challenging
the exercise of military jurisdiction over military employees charged with capital and
noncapital offenses allegedly committed in foreign countries. In the Guagliardo
case, " after summarizing the previous holdings of the Supreme Court,ar Judge
Holtzoff decided that an electrician employed by the Air Force in Morocco could
be court-martialed for a noncapital offense. A different district court in the
Grisham case, following this lead, held that an employee could be court-martialed
even when a capital offense was involved.3 8
In the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia the Guagliardo decision
was reversed.3 9 The court held that while some persons employed by the armed
forces could be made subject to military law, the blanket provision "employed by"
would violate the constitutional rights discussed in Covert. But the court avoided
a constitutional decision by holding that article 2 (11) was not severable. The Third
Circuit in Grisham40 held that it was severable, and that even though a capital
offense was involved, it had no constitutional doubts about the exercise of military
jurisdiction. Several district courts also sustained the exercise of military jurisdic-
tion.m ' Finally the four cases under discussion reached the Supreme Court.4 2
33 Id. at 16.
34 Id. at 21.
35 Id. at 41-64, and 64-70.
36 Guagliardo v. McElroy, 158 F. Supp. 171 (D.D.C. 1958).
37 A former member of the armed forces, who had been discharged is no
longer within the control of the military, is not subject to trial by court-
martial for an offense committed during his term of service.
A wife, a child, or other dependent of a member of the armed forces
is not subject to trial by court-martial in a capital case.
The Supreme Court has not determined whether a dependent accom-
panying a serviceman is subject to trial by court-martial in a case other
than capital.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has never had the occasion to decide
whether a civilian employee attached to the armed forces in a foreign
country is subject to trial by court-martial.
158 F. Supp. at 175.
38 Grisham v. Taylor, 167 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Pa. 1958).
39 Guagliardo v. McElroy, 259 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
40 Grisham v. Taylor, 261 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1958).
41 In re Yokoyama, 170 F. Supp. 467 (S.D. Cal. 1959); Wilson v. Bohlender, 167 F.Supp. 791 (D. Colo. 1958); In re Varney, 141 F. Supp. 190 (S.D. Cal. 1956). Of all the
district courts who considered this question only one, in an unreported case, denied the
exercise of jurisdiction by the military. Hurlahe v. Wilson, D.D.C., Jan. 4, 1956, cited in
In re Varney, 141 F. Supp. 190, 204 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
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The Government, in its argument, did not attack the Covert decision. While
accepting it, they argued that it should not be extended.43  The contention was
again advanced that civilians "closely connected" with the armed forces have "con-
sistently been subject to military jurisdiction."44 Historical data was marshalled to
support this contention, but it was unconvincing 5 A second approach seemed
more effective. It attempted to justify the exercise of military jurisdiction as neces-
sary and proper for the regulation of the armed forces overseas.
Approximately 25,000 employees and 455,000 dependents are abroad in 105
foreign places with various services.4e These civilians are considered members of
the armed forces by foreigners, and create disciplinary problems. 47 Their offenses
affect our relations with these nations. Criminal jurisdiction is necessary, but the
various alternatives to trial by court-martial are inadequate. First,48 trial by foreign
court is undesirable because violations of our security regulations, and offenses
against American citizens might not be prosecuted. In addition, military command-
ers should not be forced to rely on foreign courts for aid in maintaining discipline.
It is also possible that the criminal procedure of the foreign country might not
coincide with our notions of due process. Second4 9 trial in an American civil court
in the United States is not practical. New diplomatic agreements would have to be
negotiated with foreign nations. The problems of securing foreign witnesses, ex-
42 Kinsella v. Singleton, 359 U.S. 903 (1959); McElroy v. Guagliardo, 359 U.S. 904
(1959); Wilson v. Bohlender, 359 U.S. 906 (1959); Grisham v. Taylor, 359 U.S. 978 (1959).
43 Brief for the Petitioners, pp. 27-28, McElroy v. Guagliardo, 80 Sup. Ct. 305 (1960);
Brief for the Appellant, pp. 11-15 Kinsella v. Singleton, 80 Sup. Ct. 297 (1960); Brief for
Respondent, pp. 23-26, Grisham v. Hagan, 80 Sup. Ct. 310 (1960).
44 Brief for Petitioners, pp. 28-71, supra note 43.
45 Brief for Petitioners, pp. 28-71, supra note 43; Brief for Appellant, pp. 15-30, supra
note 43; Brief for Respondent, pp. 15-23, supra note 43.
46 Brief for Petitioners, pp. 110-1, supra note 43.
47 Brief for Petitioners, p. 75, supra note 43 contains the following graph which demon-
strates the number of offenses committed abroad:
Type of offense (period 1 Dec. '54 Subject to foreign Waiver of foreign
to 30 Nov. '58) jurisdiction jurisdiction obtained
Employees Dependents Employees , Dependents
Murder ......................................................... 2 0 1
Rape ............................................................... 3 1 3 1
Manslaughter (including negligent
homicide) ............................................... 32 16 10 3
Arson ...... .................................................. 0 6 0 5
Robbery, larceny and related offenses ........ 7 36 5 25
Aggravated assault........-............................... 8 8 4 4
Simple assault .............................................. 50 21 41 16
Offenses against economic control laws ......... 231 54 36 41
Traffic offenses ind. drunken and reckless
driv. and fleeing scene of accident ........... 2,566 1,791 2,187 1,587
Disorderly conduct, drunkenness, breach
of peace, etc ............................................ 28 41 19 34
Other ............................................................ 36 88 14 15
Totals .................................................. 2,962 2,064 2,319 1,732
'Combined Totals ........................................... 5,026 4,051
But referring to this graph Mr. Justice Clark in Kinsella v. Singleton, 80 Sup. Ct. 297, 302
n. 9 pointed out that:
Aside from traffic violations, there were only 273 cases (both capital
and noncapital) involving dependents subject to foreign jurisdiction,
during the period between December 1, 1954 and November 30, 1958.
This number includes 54 "Offenses against economic control laws" and
88 offenses denominated as "other."
This was not enough to convince the Court that a discipline problem existed.
48 Id. at 83-90.
49 Id. at 90-5.
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cessive delays, and great expense would also arise. Third,50 trial by an American
civil court in a foreign nation is not feasible. Assuming that the host nation would
consent to this exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction where would the grand juries,
petit juries, and competent counsel come from? Finally,51 to forbid all civilians
from accompanying the armed forces would deprive them of needed skilled personnel
and create dangerous morale problems. Given these conditions the exercise of
military jurisdiction over dependents in noncapital cases, and employees in all cases
is necessary and proper.
Mr. Justice Clark, in a surprising switch,52 announced the opinions of the
Court. 53 Referring to the Toth and Covert cases he indicated that: "The test for
jurisdiction, it follows, is one of status, namely whether the accused in the court-
martial proceeding is a person who can be regarded as falling within the term 'land
and naval forces.' ,54 Since the Court had already decided that civilian dependents
in capital cases did not fall within this power and the Government had been unable
to justify making a distinction between capital and noncapital cases, 5  Covert would
control. Necessity, even if it be a relevant factor, had not been clearly demon-
strated,56 and the due process-like balancing suggested by the concurring Justices in
Covert was not justified by history.5" "If the exercise of power [by Congress] is
valid it is because it is granted in clause 14, not because of the necessary and
proper clause."58
The question, may a civilian employee be tried by court-martial for a capital
offense committed abroad while employed by the armed forces, was also answered
in the negative. The constitutional rights discussed in Covert were held to protect
a civilian employee in a capital case. "The awesomeness of the death penalty has
no less impact when applied to civilian employees." -, In the noncapital employee
cases the severability solution was rejected. But since Singleton, Grisham, Covert
and Toth controlled, the exercise of jurisdiction was held to be unconstitutional. 0
For the third time the Court declared part of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice unconstitutional. No one will deny that the UCMJ is an enlightened crim-
inal code.61 Nevertheless, in balancing the individual's constitutional rights against
the power of Congress to regulate the land and naval forces the Court decided in
favor of civil rights. This decision should not have been a surprise.62  Military
50 Id. at 95-100.
51 Id. at 100-1.
52 He had written the dissent in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), and the majority
opinions before the rehearing.
53 Justices Harlan and Frankfurter dissented in the noncapital cases but concurred in
the capital case. Justices Whittaker and Stewart agreed that civilian dependents could not be
court-martialed for a noncapital offense, but felt that the civilian employees could be made
subject to military jurisdiction.
54 Kinsella v. Singleton, 80 Sup. Ct. 297, 300-01 (1960).
55 Id. at 301-02.
56 Id. at 302.
57 Id. at 304.
58 Id. at 304.
59 Grisham v. Hagan, 80 Sup. Ct. 310, 311 (1960).
60 McElroy v. Guagliardo, 80 Sup. Ct. 305 (1960).
61 Even Mr. Frederick Bernays Wiener who argued some of the instant cases, and Covert
had written:
The only substantive rights available to civilians but still unavailable to
those in uniform are indictment by grand jury and trial by petty jury (the
former guarantee being of doubtful value); the right to confrontation; and
the right to bail. Wiener, Courts Martial and the Bill of Rights, (pts. 1-2),
72 HARv. L. REv. 1, 266, 296 (1958).
62 At last year's term of the Court it had been pointed out that:
We do not write on a clean slate. The attitude of a free society toward
the jurisdiction of military tribunals-our reluctance to give them authority
to try people for nonmilitary offenses - has a long history. Lee v.
Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 232 (1959).
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jurisdiction over civilians has usually been restricted. 3 But while the present deci-
sions were soothing to those who instinctively distrust military authority, the Govern-
ment is left with half a million civilians overseas who, at the present time, are not
subject to our criminal jurisdiction.
Congress, however, does have the power to provide for a trial in a federal court
on the return of the accused to the United States.6" Since sovereign foreign
nations have jurisdiction to try offenses committed in their territory, this might be
another solution. 65 Experience has demonstrated that most of these nations are
humane in their treatment of criminals.66 It is also possible that most of the work
performed by civilian employees can be done by men in the service, and the
Court indicated that the needed skilled personnel could be drafted if needed.67 Other
procedures could be used to make them a part of the "land and naval forces."
It is true that these decisions will cause much discomfort. New laws will have to
be enacted, new treaties will have to be negotiated, and numerous expenses will have
to be incurred. But, as Mr. Justice Clark has indicated, this is the price we pay for
constitutional rights;69 although not a cure for the cold war, the decisions are at least
a "palliative to a troubled world." 7 0
Joseph A. Marino
COPYRIGHT - LrrERARY PROPERTY IN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS - WRITINGS
OF A GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL NOT PART OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTmS ARE NOT IN THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN ALTHOUGH THEY RELATE TO OR ARISE OUT OF His OFFICIAL
DUTIEs - Plaintiff publishing house sought in a declaratory judgment action to
have certain speeches of defendant, a Vice Admiral of the United States Navy, de-
clared to be in the public domain. Defendant had delivered twenty-three speeches
on various topics before numerous organizations and groups. Mimeographed copies
of each of the speeches were usually distributed at or about the time of the speech
to interested persons, but only subsequent to December 1, 1958, did the defendant
place a copyright notice on these mimeographed copies and adopt the practice of
obtaining a copyright on each of his addresses at the time of delivery. Held, literary
products of a Government official that have some bearing on, or arise out of his
official actions are not in the public domain, but remain the property of the author
if their writing and delivery is not part of his official duties. Public Affairs Press v.
Rickover, 177 F. Supp. 601 (D.D.C. 1959).
Protection for their literary productions is provided to authors both by the
common law" and by statute. 2 A recognition of these two distinct rights is essential
to a proper understanding of the instant case. Reference is made to the common
law protection as the right of first publication.3 The rights secured by statute are
63 See the cases cited in note 11 supra.
64 U. S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
65 In Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957) the Court said that a sovereign nation
had exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses committed against its laws. It is interesting to
note that in one of the instant cases the petitioner had been arrested and charged with
murder by the French government, before he was court-martialed by the military authorities
of the United States. Brief for Respondent, pp. 4-5, Grisham v. Hagan, 80 Sup. Ct. 310
(1960).
66 The Girard incident is a good example.
67 McElroy v. Guagliardo, 80 Sup. Ct. 305, 309 (1960).
68 It was suggested that procedures like those followed in Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S.
109 (1895) and Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879) would permit the exercise of military
jurisdiction. McElroy v. Guagliardo, 80 Sup. Ct. 305, 308 (1960).
69 McElroy v. Guagliardo, 80 Sup. Cit. 305, 309 (1960).
70 Kinsella v. Singleton, 80 Sup. Ct. 297, 305 (1960).
1 White v. Kimmel, 94 F. Supp. 502 (S.D. Cal. 1950). See generally HOWELL, THE
COPYRIGHT LAW 1-10 (1952).
2 17 U.S.C. (1958).
3 E.g., Pushman v. N.Y. Graphic Society, Inc., 287 N.Y. 302, 39 N.E.2d 249 (1942).
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properly referred to as copyrights.4 This terminology avoids the confusion that re-
sults from the use of the word copyright to designate both rights. 5
The right of first publication is that of an author to publish or refrain from
publishing his production. It enables an author to permit the use of his work by
some to the exclusion of others and to give a copy of his manuscript to another
person without parting with his property right in it.6 This right exists until an au-
thor permits a general publication of his work.7 To constitute a general publication
there must be "a dissemination of the work of art itself among the public as to jus-
tify the belief that it took place with the intention of rendering such work common
property." 8 A limited publication communicates the contents of a manuscript to
a definite group and for a limited purpose not including the right of diffusion, re-
production or sale, and does not result in the loss of the right of first publication,9
which then must mean the right of first general publication.
Upon general publication the only rights which an author has are those se-
cured by compliance with the Federal Copyright Act.10 It also appears at present
that the right of first publication is lost by registering the work with the copyright
office, whether or not there is a general publication."- In any event, it is clear that
a copyright and the right of first publication cannot co-exist.' 2
Plaintiff's claim of public ownership is thus reducible to two propositions: First,
it was maintained that the speeches delivered after December 1, 1958, were in the
public domain because, having been registered with the copyright office, and mi-
meographed copies having been distributed with the copyright notice, the only rights
that remained were those secured by the Federal Copyright Act. Plaintiff main-
mined that the act afforded no protection since the speeches were government
publications within that section of the act which provides that no copyright shall
subsist in any government publication.1 Second, plaintiff contended that no matter
who was deemed to be the proprietor of the speeches given before December 1, 1958,
they were in the public domain because there had been a general publication of
them without even an attempt to comply with the copyright act.
The court disposed of this second contention by finding that the facts showed
no general publication. This holding is in accord with the current trend of judicial
thought which fully recognizes the benefit that accrues to society in permitting more
comprehensive disclosures to be included within the concept of limited publication 4
when there has been no attempt to secure a copyright.
The speeches delivered after December 1, 1958 presented a more difficult
problem. As the court viewed it, publications by government officers and employees
could be divided into three categories. The first consists of publications which the
employee was hired to produce. 5 The second consists of publications completely
unrelated to his job. And the third, lying between the other two, consists of those
publications having some bearing on, or that arise out of his official actions, although
the writing of books or delivering of addresses was not part of his official duties.
4 Krafft v. 'Cohen, 117 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1941).
5 Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 35 Cal. App. 2d 653, 221 P.2d 73 (1950).
6 Frohman v. Ferris, 238 Ill. 430, 87 N.E. 327 (1912), aff'd, 223 U.S. 424 (1912).
7 White v. Kimmell, 94 F. Supp. 502 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
8 American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 299-300 (1907).
9 White v. Kimmell, 94 F. Supp. 502 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
10 17 U.S.C. (1958); White v. Kimmell, 94 F. Supp. 502 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
11 Brown v. Select Theatres Corp., 56 F. Supp. 438 (D. Mass. 1944).
12 The difference in protection given by these two rights is not discussed. The case was
heard upon an agreed statement of facts. The question was whether the defendant had any
property rights in his speeches. If he had either right it was apparently admitted in the
instant case that the use which the plaintiff sought to make of the speeches would be unlawful.
13 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
14 White v. Kimmell, 94 F. Supp. 502 (S.D. Cal. 1950); Young, Plagiarism, Piracy, and
the Common Law Copyright, 5 ASCAP COPYRIGHT LAW SymPosiuM 205-29 (1954).
15 Heine v. Appleton, 11 Fed. Cas. 1031 (No. 6324) (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1857).
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The court, finding that the speeches in question were in the third category, was
faced with an issue never decided on the appellate level. 16
The question was whether or not literary productions in the third category were,
like those in the first, government publications not capable of being copyrightedy-
or, like those in the second category, the property of their author and capable of
being copyrighted.
The court held that such publications were not government publications. It
agreed with the trial court' 8 decision in Sherrill v. Grieves's that the literary prod-
ucts in the third category were not in the public domain, but remained the property
of their author to the extent that the common law and the law of copyright other-
wise protected him. In the instant case the defendant, having fully complied with
the statutory requisites for the granting of a copyright, obtained full protection.
It is submitted that the court ruled correctly on this issue. Plaintiff sought to
do violence to our traditional notions of property in the area of government em-
ployment. Plaintiff, upon the policy considerations that the creator of a literary
production is employed by the public, has gotten the germ of his creation from his
public calling and has used public facilities to put it into concrete form, sought to
make the creation public. It is submitted that our political and economic system is
based upon the contrary proposition that satisfying the desire of the individual to
acquire and enjoy property is the safest and most promising basis for society.20
Rocco L. Puntureri
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS - PROBATE JURISDICTION - AUTOMOBILE
LIILITY INSURANCE CONTRACT HELD ASSET WARRANTING ANCILLARY LETTERS. -
Decedent, Robert A. Riggle, an Illinois resident, was insured under a contract of
liability insurance issued in Nassau County, New York, by an insurer authorized to
do business in New York. Pursuant to this contract the insurance company defended
Riggle in a suit resulting from an automobile accident in the State of Wyoming.
Jurisdiction in this suit was obtained by personal service on the defendant within
the State of New York. While the suit was pending, Robert Riggle died, still a
resident of Illinois, and a motion was filed in the Surrogate's court, Nassau County,
for the issuance of ancillary letters of administration so that the suit could continue
in New York. The executrix of Riggle's estate, appointed in Illinois, protested,
claiming that the decedent was a resident of Illinois and had no property in New
York upon which the court could issue the letters. Held, the automobile liability
insurance policy is a sufficient asset to give the Surrogate's court for the county in
which the policy was written jurisdiction to grant ancillary letters of administration.
In re Riggle's Will, 188 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1959).
When one dies testate, his will is administered by an executor who derives his
authority from that instrument.' When one dies intestate the law appoints an ad-
ministrator for the deceased's estate.2 In either case, the court will issue letters
testamentary or letters of administration, which serve as credentials for the repre-
sentative. It is the'court decree or records which confer the right to act,3 but it is
16 The court stated that the question does not appear to have been raised in any re-
ported case decided by any appellate court. Sherrill v. Grieves, 57 WAsH. L. REP. 286 (1929),
cited by the court as having the same issue, was decided by a trial court.
17 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
18 This decision was rendered by the predecessor of the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia.
19 57 WAsHr. L. REP. 286 (1929).
20 Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent in American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States,
257 U.S. 377 (1921).
1 In re Kennedy's Estate, 266 N.Y. Supp. 883 (1933).
2 In re Thompson's Estate, 339 Mo. 410, 97 S.W.2d 93 (1936).
3 Wirt v. Pintard, 40 La. Ann. 233, 4 So. 14 (1888).
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the issued letters in the hands of the representative which evidences this right to
those concerned with the estate. These letters are either domiciliary or ancillary. They
are domiciliary if issued in the jurisdiction of decedent's domicile, and ancillary if
issued anywhere else. Hence, ancillary letters are issued by a foreign jurisdiction in
order to aid in the general administration of the estate. Some res located in the
foreign jurisdiction is a requisite for issuance of letters in that jurisdiction,4 and
the authority of the representative appointed will extend only to that res which is
located therein.5
The issue in the instant case was whether a policy of automobile liability in-
surance written in the county of jurisdiction was sufficient in itself to warrant the
issuance of ancillary letters by the Surrogate's Court. Two questions are involved:
1) Can the insurance be considered an asset? and, 2) If it is an asset, can it be
said to be located within the issuing jurisdiction? Both conditions must be present
in order to give the court jurisdiction to issue ancillary letters.
The authorities are divided on the question of whether an insurance policy
constitutes an asset of the non-resident insured's estate which will empower a court
to issue ancillary letters. For the purpose of brevity those decisions holding that it
is not an asset shall be called the Kansas rule.6 Those holding that it is an asset
which will warrant the issuance of ancillary letters shall be referred to as the New
Hampshire rule.7
The Kansas court in the leading case of In re Roger's Estate" reasoned that
the insurer is merely an indemnitor and there can be no debt until liability of the
insured is established. Therefore the insurance policy could not be considered an
asset of decedent's estate since his liability had not been settled. The court betrayed
some uncertainty as to this reasoning by basing its decision on the fact that even if
the policy were an asset, it was not located in Kansas.9 Personal property was held
to be transitory prior to death, but on death the situs becomes fixed at the place of
domicile.10 Michigan 1 held that since the deceased himself could not have main-
tained an action against insurer in the county before his death, the county could
not grant letters permitting insurer to be sued by another. A federal district court
4 In re Roger's Will, 232 N.Y. Supp. 609 (1929).
5 Id. at 613.
6 The instant court lists, with supporting case citations, the states of Colorado, Idaho,
Kansas, Michigan and Oklahoma as following the Kansas rule. Further research discloses
that Ohio also follows this rule. See In re Wilcox's Estate, 60 Ohio Ops. 232, 137 N.E.2d
301 (1955). See also In re Klipple's Estate, 101 So.2d 924 (Fla. App. 1958); In re Roche's
Estate, 16 N.J. 579, 109 A.2d 655 (1954). These two cases are often cited as holding that
an insurance policy is not an asset but in each case there was a finding that the insurer was
not a resident of the state and therefore the requirement of situs was not met.
7 The instant court lists, with supporting authorities, as following the New Hampshire
rule, the states of Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Oregon and Texas.
In addition to these, four other states have been found to follow this rule. See In re Kre-
sovich's Estate, 168 Neb. 673, 97 N.W.2d 239 (1959); Kimbell v. Smith, 64 N.M. 374, 328
P.2d 942 (1958); In re Leigh's Estate, 6 Utah 299, 313 P.2d 455 (1957); In re Breese's
Estate, 51 Wash. 2d 302, 317 P.2d 1055 (1957). Iowa,; alone, legislatively provides that an
insurance policy is an asset having situs in Iowa in any civil action arising from a motor
vehicle accident. IOWA CODE § 321.512 (1958). But see In re Fagin's Estate, 246 Iowa 496,
66 N.W.2d 920 (1954), where the court read into this statute a requirement that the in-
surance company be licensed to transact business in Iowa.
8 .164 Kan. 492, 190 P.2d 857 (1948).
9 Accord, Wheat v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 128 Colo. 236, 261 P.2d 493 (1953).
10 In re De Land's Estate, 181 Kan. 729, 315 P.2d 611 (1957) casts doubt on whether
or not the Kansas court would still follow the Rogers holding today. In that case, a Kansas
domiciliary died leaving intangible property in Missouri. The Kansas court ruled that the
situs of the personal property was in Missouri and not Kansas.
11 Olson v. Preferred Auto Ins. Co., 259 Mich. 612, 244 N.W. 178 (1932). Here a
local statute stipulated that an insurance company could be sued only in the county of its
home office and therefore, if decedent were alive he could not have maintained an action
in any other county. On this basis, the Michigan case is distinguished in Liberty v. Kinney,
242 Iowa 656, 47 N.W.2d 835 (1951).
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sitting in Idaho maintained that only the county in which the accident occurred
could be said to have jurisdiction .1 2
Holding to the contrary, the New Hampshire court, in Robinson v. Dana's
Estate,13 found that the insurance policy was a sufficient asset to warrant letters and
that it was located within the court's jurisdiction. The appointment was held not
to depend on the probable merits of the claim since to deny letters on this ground
would be to take jurisdiction away from the proper state courts. The representative
is appointed so that a suit can be instituted to determine the merits of the claim in
the proper courts. "The event had taken place on account of which he was entitled
to protection if certain things were done." 14 Thus, the policy, once taken out, and
once an accident occurs, is no different from an unmatured note. When a creditor
presents a claim for an appointment of a representative, he need not show the
validity of the claim - that is left to other courts. The question of the situs of the
debt presented no problem. The creditor's domicile is generally considered the fic-
tional residence of the debt, but the enforcement can be had only where the debtor
is found or served. Hence, the debt can be said to be located in either or both
parties' domicile.
The Massachusetts court 5 agreed with the Robinson case by holding that a
creditor can be one holding a tort claim as well as a contract claim. Here a statute
permitting a creditor to request ancillary appointment was construed.
Paraphrased, the position of the courts following the New Hampshire rule is
that the ownership of an insurance policy can be said to be a property right in that
it at least contingently protects the holder against loss. Under this theory, the in-
surer is a debtor of its insured and if the insurer is licensed to do business in a state
he becomes a resident of that state. Since, under the New Hampshire rule, the situs
of a debt is at the residence of the debtor, it logically follows that the court in that
situs would have jurisdiction. Generally speaking, the situs of specialty debts shall
be where the instrument happens to be, and of choses in action where the debtor
resides.'6
The Nebraska court analogized from the wrongful death statutes where the
cause of action is said to be sufficient asset and asked the question: "How can the
claimed liability be treated as an asset, while the insurance by which the liability is
transferred is not?" "7
The Utah court' s extended the New Hampshire rule to cases where the insurer
is not a resident in the state of administration. The reason given was that it is not
a question of jurisdiction with the issuing court, but a question of propriety, i.e., if
the court thinks ancillary letters are necessary and proper, it may grant them.
The instant court adopted the New Hampshire rule because it felt that rights
under an insurance contract have a very real commercial value. It characterized
as technical, artificial, and unrealistic the Kansas rule that exoneration and liability
under an insurance contract is not an asset. To illustrate this contention the court
pointed out that the insurance company received an annual premium of $62.35 for
this obligation of exoneration and liability. The court went on to say that to hold
"such rights are insufficient to give the court jurisdiction, but that a five dollar
watch found in the state would confer such jurisdiction appears to put theory in
place of facts." 19
An examination of the reasoning applied on both sides of the question reveals
12 Feil v. Dice, 135 F. Supp. 851 (S.D. Idaho 1955). The court noted the fact that
there had been no determination of this question by an Idaho court.
13 87 N.H. 114, 174 At. 772 (1934).
14 Id. at 117, 174 Atl. at 775.
15 Gordon v. Shea, 300 Mass. 95, 14 N.E.2d 105 (1938).
16 19 CHI-KENT L. REV. 293 (1941).
17 In re Kresovich's Estate, 168 Neb. 673, 97 N.W.2d 239, 244 (1959).
18 In re Leigh's Estate, 6 Utah 299, 313 P.2d 455 (1957).
19 In re Riggle's Will, 188 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1959).
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the difficulty courts have in finding a rationale for their decisions. For example, it
is incongruous to speak of the situs of an intangible. As may be expected then, the
real basis for decision is the underlying policy of the state courts. The primary con-
flicting policy consideration is whether the advantage of a single administration with
its reduced costs, taxes, and red tape outweighs the desire of the state to protect its
local claimants against non-resident tort feasors. The following should also be con-
sidered in granting letters ancillary: (1) it does not impose an undue burden upon
the insurer to defend since he must be doing business in the state for letters to issue,20
(2) it may be easier to get witnesses in the state in which the accident occurred,
and (3) the judgment will not affect the domiciliary administrator.21 In regard to
(2) above, in every case except the instant case, the accident had occurred in the
state in which letters were requested. Although here the accident had not occurred
in New York, still it would be more convenient for the plaintiff to keep the suit in
the state in which it was started, while it would cause no hardship to the defendant.
The New Hampshire rule is in keeping with the current trend in procedure
which provides for easier suits by plaintiffs, especially in cases involving non-resident
motorists. With an influential jurisdiction such as New York joining the New Hamp-
shire ranks, a greater acceptance of this rationale may be expected as the question
arises in uncommitted states.
Edward M. O'Toole
INCOME TAX - MULTI-CoRPORATE ORGANIZATIONS - SECTION 129(a)
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1939 EXTENDED TO DISALLOW AN ACQUIRED COR-
PORATION ITS TAX CREDITS AND EXEMPTIONS. - Taxpayer, James Realty Co., was
a corporation formed by Adolph Fine, an individual, for the avowed purpose of
real estate development. Its initial assets consisted of undeveloped tracts of land,
contributed by Mr. Fine in exchange for sufficient stock to secure control of the
newly formed corporation. Adolph Fine, the individual, also controlled Adolph
Fine, Inc., a construction company, Fine Realty, Inc., a real estate sales organiza-
tion, and other real estate development companies. The Commissioner disallowed
taxpayer's surtax exemption and excess profits credit under section 129(a)1 and
15(c) 2 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Held, affirmed. Section 129(a)
may be extended to disallow an acquired corporation its tax credits and exemptions
when it is formed for tax evasion or avoidance. James Realty Company v. United
States, 176 F. Supp. 306 (D. Minn. 1959).
The basic question was the applicability of section 129(a) of the 1939 Code
to the formation of separate corporations that operate various phases of one busi-
ness, when these corporations are not formed by splitting the existing corporation,
but are created out of the personal assets of an individual.
Three sections of the 1939 Code disallowed tax advantages accruing to cor-
porations by manipulation of the corporate entity. Section 453 authorized the
Commissioner to "distribute, apportion or allocate gross income, deductions, credits
or allowances" among business organizations owned or controlled by the same
interest when the Commissioner determined that such allocation was necessary to
20 That the insurer must be doing business within the state is a requisite for the issuance
of ancillary letters in states following the New Hampshire rule. See, e.g., Furst v. Brady, 375
Ill. 425, 31 N.E.2d 606 (1940). Utah, however, has granted letters when the insurer was
not doing business in the state. See In re Leigh's Estate, 6 Utah 299, 313 P.2d 455 (1957).
21 First Nat'l Bank v. Blessing, 231 Mo. App. 288, 98 S.W.2d 149 (1936).
1 Added by ch. 63, § 128(a), 58 Stat. 21 (1944) (now INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§ 269(a)).
2 Added by ch. 521, § 121(f), 65 Stat. 468 (1951) (now INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§ 1551).
3 Ch. 289, § 45, 52 Stat. 474 (1938) (now INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 482).
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prevent tax evasion. Section 129(a) was aimed at the purchase of loss corporations
by a taxpayer who wished to take advantage of such corporation's loss carryover
and excess profits credit.4 The section stated:
a. Disallowance of deduction, credit, or allowance. If (1) any person or
persons acquire . . . directly or indirectly, control of a corporation . . .
and the principal purpose for which such acquisition was made is evasion
or avoidance of Federal Income or Excess Profits Tax by securing the
benefit of a deduction, credit, or other allowance which such person or
corporation would not otherwise enjoy, then such deduction, credit, or
other allowance shall not be allowed.
The third section, 15(c),s was aimed specifically at the splitting of an existing cor-
poration for the purpose of obtaining an additional corporate surtax exemption.6
This latter section, although placed in issue in the instant case, was cursorily handled
by the court since taxpayer's claim for relief was denied under section 129(a). An
examination of these three sections, viewed in the light of the generally accepted
tax law doctrine of Gregory v. Helvering is essential to any consideration of the
legislative purpose underlying each of them. s The Gregory doctrine is essentially
that although all formal requisites of a non-taxable transaction have been shown,
tax benefits achieved thereby may be disallowed if there was no valid business pur-
pose for the transaction.
Early cases indicated obiter that section 129(a) was to be interpreted as dis-
allowing exemptions which an acquiring corporation had obtained from the acquired
corporation, but that the restriction did not apply "to their use by the corporation
whose control was acquired." 9 For example, if corporation A, with high profits, were
to acquire control of corporation B, with a loss carryover, corporation A's use of B's
loss carryover would be precluded by section 129 (a) if the acquisition were made
for tax avoidance purposes; however, corporation B, being the acquired corporation
in the transaction, would be permitted to continue the use of its loss carryover
Until British Motor Car Distributors, Ltd.,'0 the application of section 129 (a) was
not strictly in issue since the court had found a valid business purpose as the basis
of the acquisition in each of the cases. But in British there was no attempt by the
4 Dilworth v. Henslee, 98 F. Supp. 957 (D. Tenn. 1951); Rudick, Acquisitions to
Avoid Income or Excess Profits Tax: Section 129 of the Internal Revenue Code, 58 HIAv.
L. REv. 196, 200-06 (1944).
5 Added by ch. 521, § 121(f), 65 Stat. 468 (1951) (now INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§ 1551). It states:
Disallowance of surtax exemption and accumulated earnings credit: If
any corporation transfers . . . all or part of its property . . . to another
corporation which was created for the purpose of acquiring such property
or which was not actively engaged in business at the time of such acquisition
and if the transferor corporation or its stockholders control the transferee
then the exemption or deduction will be disallowed unless such transferee
corporation shall establish by the clear preponderance of the evidence that
the securing of such exemption or credit was not a major purpose of such
transfer.
6 Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.15 -2(b)l (1939); 7 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAxATioN 164 (1956).
7 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
8 Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.15 -2(b)l states:
It is not intended that section 15(c) be interpreted as delimiting or abro-
gating any principle of law established by judicial decision or any existing
principle of the Internal Revenue Code such as section 45 and 129....
Such principles of law and such provisions of the Code, including section
15(c) are not mutually exclusive, and in appropriate cases they may operate
together or they may operate separately.
9 Alprosa Watch Corp., 11 T.C. 240 (1948) was the first such interpretation. The
dicta there prompted similar dicta in subsequent cases. Chelsea Products, Inc., 197 F.2d
620 (3d Cir. 1952); TVD Co. 27 T.C. 879 (1957); WAGE, Inc., 19 T.C. 249 (1952);
Berland's Inc., of South Bend, 16 T.C. 182 (1951); A.B. and Container Corp., 14 T.C. 842
(1950). Only a very few cases have been decided under section 129(a).
10 31.44 PHTC (1958), appeal authorized, 56366 PH Fed. Tax. Curt. Dec. (1959).
(Five judges dissenting.).
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taxpayer to show a business purpose for the acquisition and what in previous cases
had been mere dicta, was elevated t6 a holding. In British, taxpayer, a corporation,
had been acquired by a partnership. The partnership assets were then transferred
to taxpayer, leaving the taxpayer the sole extant business after the transaction. The
taxpayer, claiming the status of an acquired corporation, relied on the Alprosa
Watch Corp. Ia dicta and successfully contended that it could use its prior loss carry-
over. The result was that the Commissioner could not disallow credits of an ac-
quired corporation, even when the maneuver was in effect a 129(a) situation,
because of the artifice of the taxpayer in causing the acquiring partnership to lose
its identity within the acquired corporation by a mere transfer of assets.
The court in the present case rejected British Motor Car as wrongly decided
and relied upon two recent federal court decisions. The first of these, Mill Ridge
Coal Co. v. Patterson," does not appear to indicate that section 129(a) is applicable
to an acquired corporation, but is rather an ordinary 129 (a) case. The Fifth Circuit
held that it was proper to disallow, under section 129(a), a loss carryovrer that a
corporation had acquired by purchase of another company. The fact that the tax-
payer corporation was newly formed seems to be the only direct parallel between
that case and the instant one.
The second case relied on is a stronger support for the present case. In Coastal
Oil Storage v. Commissioner,22 there was an arrangement very similar to Adolph
Fine's related businesses. Tax credits and the surtax exemption were denied to an
"acquired corporation" 13 born of a split-up of the original corporation, upon a find-
ing that the split was not made for a valid business purpose. 14 The Fourth Circuit
interpreted section 129 (a) as having a broad scope, citing the words of the House
Report pertaining to it: "The scope of the terms used in this section is to be
found in the objective of the section, namely, to prevent the tax liability from being
reduced through the distortion or perversion effected through tax avoidance de-
vices." 15 But the facts of the Coastal Oil case were unique. There, an existing cor-
poration set up a new corporation by transfer of assets. There was no evidence of
an acceptable business purpose. The Commissioner concluded that the formation
of the new corporation was effected to avoid surtax to the original corporation by
splitting its income. Although this is exactly the type of situation that 15(c) was
passed to foreclose, section 15 (c) could not be applied to the entire period in issue
because the recently formed corporation's taxable year had begun two months be-
fore the operative date of the newly passed section. The court had to turn to
129 (a) to find a useful, if not readily adaptable, weapon to disallow the corporate
surtax exemption for the first two months in question.'" Out of this situation grew
the more extensive application of section 129 (a) to an acquired corporation. How-
ever, section 129 (a) came into play in Coastal only after a definite wrong on the
part of the taxpayer had been ascertained under section 15 (c). Thus there seems
to be a compelling reason to invoke any section of the Code that would give effect
to a section 15 (c) misallocation of income in the interim between that section's
10a 11 T.G. 240 (1948).
11 264 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1959).
12 242 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1957).
13 "Acquired corporation" is used in the same sense as the court uses it in James, Le.,
to include a corporation formed by an existing corporation.
14 Criticized, 42 VA. L. Rxv. 1134 (1957), on the basis that this was too great an ex-
tension of § 129(a), a section passed for the purpose of curtailing the market in loss
corporations.
15 H.R. REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1939).
16 The Regulation illustration of a 129(a) violation seems to track the Coastal Oil case very
closely. It stated:
. . .tAmong the transactions within clause 1 of section 129(a) are the
following: ...
(2) A corporation with large profits transfers the assets of each of its
branches or departments to newly organized corporations in order to secure
the benefit of the exemption provided in section 431.
Treas. Reg. 118 § 39.129 -3(b).
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passage and its operative date. Also, in Coastal, one corporation split its income by
formation of another corporation. In the James case, none of Adolph Fine's various
corporations gave birth to James Realty; Adolph Fine the individual formed this
corporation. How can it then be said that any corporation has been acquired by
another corporation, when an individual who owns a group of companies forms
another company and retains control thereof?
When an attempt is made to fit the factual situation of the instant case into
either of the specific pigeonholes of section 129(a) or section 15(c), a court is im-
mediately confronted with great difficulty. Section 129(a) proves difficult in view
of the case law indications that an acquired corporation may not be deprived of its
tax credits and exemptions, whatever the purpose of the acquisition, and section
15(c) begins, "if any corporation transfers. . ." and is aimed at corporate income
splitting. In the instant case, Adolph Fine the individual formed James by transfer
of his own property to it - not the property of any of his corporations. It would
require a tenuous extension of the statutory language to determine that the statutory
word "corporation" is meant to include individuals who control corporations. Even
assuming that the income of James Realty Co. would have been made by the tax-
payer's other corporations had not James been formed, it is difficult to find a split-
ting of their income by the creation of a corporation to handle the development
of a new realty subdivision.
Although not placed in issue in the present case,1 7 the more general section 45
seems to be the most applicable here. It applies not merely to acquisitions and splits
by corporations, but to control by the same interests of "two or more organizations,
trades, or businesses" resulting in evasion of taxes or misstatement of income of any
of the members of the business organization controlled. The Commissioner, at his
discretion, could allocate the income among the various members of the Fine or-
ganization. There would be no need for an analysis of the acquired-acquiring cor-
poration morass.
Assuming that the instant court was correct in determining that there was no
valid business purpose for the formation of James, an examination of the effect of
a contra holding will underscore the merits of the result reached. An individual who
controls numerous corporations in a particular business could set up new entities to
handle exactly the same business as the existing ones were chartered to transact and
avoid surtax on the initial income in each case. Such a decision would be an obvi-
ous refusal to follow the well-established principle set down long ago in the Gregory
decision.
However, the court's fact determination, that tax evasion or avoidance moti-
vated the formation of James, is subject to criticism. The relatively few cases de-
cided under section 129(a) seem to have given taxpayers the benefit of the doubt
on this issue. Past decisions have found a valid business purpose in forming cor-
porations to separate production from sales; 18 to split along state lines in order to
get the advantages of domestic incorporation;' 9 to reduce liability or risk on busi-
ness leases; 20 and to limit tort liability risks and improve the credit position of the
resulting corporations. 21 The liberality of the courts in this area has prompted one
writer to remark: "Section 129 has thus been rendered almost completely ineffec-
tive, and this fact contributed in a large part to the enactment of section 15(c) ." 22
The court in the instant case, however, is certainly not in accord with this liberality
17 The court considered cases decided under section 45 as an analogy supporting its
conclusion. Since section 45 uses much broader language than section 129(a), it is doubtful
that an extension of it to an acquired corporation would justify a similar extension of section
129(a).
18 Chelsea Products, Inc., 16 T.C. 840 (1951).
19 J. E. Dilworth v. Henslee, 98 F. Supp. 957 (D. Tenn. 1951).
20 Berland's Inc. of South Bend, 16 T.C. 182 (1951).
21 Alcorn Wholesale Co., 16 T.C. 75 (1951.)
22 Ekman, Warning Signals Under Sections 45 and 129, N.Y.U. 12TH ANN. INST. ON
FED. TAx. (1954) 693, 698.
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in its interpretation. Plaintiff indicated in its brief, that the formation of James
was motivated by a desire to protect Adolph Fine, Inc., and Fine Realty Corp.
from the risks inherent in the actual development function.2 3 Could it not be said
a- sound business purpose exists in the setting up of separate corporations to handle
separate economic functions such as real estate acquisition, development, and sales,
just as where one company will manufacture the product and another will be re-
sponsible for its distribution? This type of division is common to the business com-
munity.
The decision in the instant case places the future of a great number of multiple
corporations in jeopardy, due to the difficulty they will have when called upon to
prove that their formation was motivated primarily for business purposes.
Paul B. Coffey
LABOR LAW - HRNG HALL - CONTRACT PROVIDING FOR EXCLUSIVE HIRING
HALL Is NOT ILLEGAL ABSENT PROOF OF ACTUAL DIscRIMINATION. - A hod-
carrier with some twenty years experience filed charges with the National Labor
Relations Board alleging that he had been consistently denied employment at a
hiring hall operated by the union' pursuant to its contract with an employer's
association.2 He further alleged that the union attempted to coerce him into with-
drawing these charges, and that, after having been dropped for non-payment of
dues, his subsequent efforts to rejoin the union were frustrated. The Trial Examiner
found 3 that the union violated section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act4 by
its conduct, but refused to hold the employers and the union, in the absence of
positive evidence, guilty of discrimination under sections 8 (a) (3) and 8 (b) (2)
of the act.5 The Board affirmed the Examiner's first finding, but reversed the
second determination, holding that the execution and maintenance of an exclusive
hiring hall contract was in itself unlawful discrimination. 6 On petition for enforce-
ment, held, denied. Absent proof of actual discrimination, a hiring hall contract
is not per se illegal. NLRB v. Mountain Pacific Chapter, 270 F.2d 425 (9th Cir.
1959).
Section 8 (b) (2) of the Taft-Hartley Act makes it illegal for a union to
cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate in regard to hire, tenure,
terms or conditions of employment for the purpose of encouraging or discouraging
membership in a union. In framing these provisions, Congress evidently did not
intend to eliminate altogether the hiring hall arrangement.7 Only those practices
under such an agreement which amount to the maintenance of a closed shop were
prohibited. 8 Accordingly, courts have indicated that "the factor in a hiring hall
arrangement which makes the device an unfair labor practice is the agreement
to hire only union members referred to the employer," 9 and that the hiring hall
23 Reply Brief for the Plaintiff, pp. 5,6.
1 International Hodcarriers, AFL-CIO.
2 The Associated General Contractors; Mountain Pacific, Seattle, and Tacoma Chapters.
3 Mountain Pacific Chapter, 119 N.L.R.B. 883, 910 (1957).
4 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (1) (A) (1952).
5 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 141, (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (3) and 158(b)(2) (1952).
6 Mountain Pacific Chapter, 119 N.L.R.B. 883 (1957). The order issued by the Board
provided that the respondents cease giving effect to the hiring hall provisions of the contract
and reimburse the individual for any loss of pay he may have sustained as a result of the
illegal conduct.
7 See S. RxP. No. 1287, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. (Remarks of Senator Taft) (1950).
8 See, e.g., NLRB v. National Maritime Union, 175 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1949).
9 NLRB v. Del E. Webb Constr. Co., 196 F.2d 841, 845 (8th Cir. 1952). See Eichleay
Corp. v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 799 (3rd Cir. 1953); NLRB v. F. H. McGraw & Co., 206 F.2d
635 (6th Cir. 1953).
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system itself is proper if union and non-union men are referred to the company
without discrimination. 10 The Board itself originally enunciated this rule.:1
The action of the Board in the instant case, however, constituted a departure
from this principle. To the Board the Mountain Pacific contract apparently effected
a surrender of all hiring authority to the union. It was advance notice to the world
that the union was the contractual hiring master.'2 The Board reasoned that this
delegation was unlawful on its face because "from the standpoint of the working
force generally ... it is difficult to conceive of anything that would encourage their
subservience to union activity more than this kind of hiring hall."'' Finding such,
it cited Radio Officers Union v. NLRB 4 for the position that, unlawful conduct
having been established, illegal encouragement may be inferred without additional
positive evidence. The Board added, however, that it did not construe the act as
prohibiting all hiring arrangements. s In the future, such agreements would not
be considered per se violations, if they contained certain safeguards which the Board
felt would negate the unlawful encouragement inherent in the hiring hall
arrangement.' 6
Relying upon its holding in NLRB v. Swinerton,7 however, the court in the
instant case disagreed with the Board and reasserted the principle that "hiring of
employees done only through a particular union's offices does not violate the Act
absent evidence that the union unlawfully discriminated in supplying the company
with personnel."' 8 The court noted that a contract lawful on its face could still
serve to hide discriminatory practices despite an inclusion of the provisions pro-
mulgated by the Board. In the opinion of the court the provisions did not possess
such preventive value to warrant a finding that their absence constituted a per se
violation of the act. The court did add, however, that its holding would not pre-
clude the Board in the future from finding "as a fact that the omission of the
guaranties or prohibitory clauses from a contract was evidence of an intent upon
the part of the signatories and their associates to violate the Act."' 9 Yet this rule
of evidence would have to operate prospectively, since the burden of proving the
absence of a possible violation would be shifted from the General Counsel to the
charged parties.
10 NLRB v. Swinerton, 202 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 814(1953). It should be noted that although the Swinerton case is invariably cited for this
proposition, the decision in the case ultimately rested on a finding of actual discrimination.
11 Hunkin-Conkey Constr. Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 433, 435 (1951).
12 Mountain Pacific Chapter, 119 N.L.R.B. 883, 894-95 (1957). The contract provided
that: 1) the recruitment of employees shall be the responsibility of the union which shall
maintain offices for this purpose for the convenience of the employers and the workmen,
2) employers shall call upon the local union in whose territory the work is to be done, 3)
if the union cannot supply the workmen requested, the employer may procure them from
another source.
13 Id. at 895.
14 347 U.S. 17, 45 (1954).
15 Mountain Pacific Chapter, 119 N.L.R.B. 883, 896 (1957).
16 Id. at 897. The requisite safeguards provide:
1) Selection of applicants for referral to jobs shall be on a non-discriminatory basis
and shall not be based on, or in any way affected by, union membership, bylaws,
rules, regulations, constitutional provisions, or any other aspect or obligation of
union membership, policies, or requirements.
2) The employer retains the right to reject any applicant referred by the union.
3) The parties to the agreement post in places where notices to employees and ap-
plicants for employment are customarily posted, all provisions relating to the
functioning of the hiring agreement, including the safeguards that we [the Board]
deem essential to the legality of an exclusive hiring agreement.
17 202 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 814 (1953). See also NLRB v.
Del E. Webb Constr. Co., 196 F.2d 841 (8th Cir. 1953); Eichleay Corp. v. NLRB, 206 F.2d
799 (3rd Cir. 1953); NLRB v. F. H. McGraw & Co., 206 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1953).
18 NLRB v. Mountain Pacific Chapter, 270 F.2d 425, 429-30 (9th Cir. 1959).
19 Id. at 428.
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Because of the wide application which the Board has given its Mountain Pacific
rule, the significance of the instant opinion should not be underestimated. Although
hiring halls are most often associated with the maritime and construction industries,
the Board has extended the rule to include contracts involving brewers,2 0 truckers,2
manufacturers22 - in short, to all agreements where an employer confers exclusive
hiring authority on a union.2 3 The rule has also been applied where an employer's
action of hiring through the union amounts only to a general practice, 24 and where
an employer, although not a party to such a contract, nevertheless subscribes to
its provisions.25 Also, the contract or agreement must include all three of the
requisite safeguards to be lawful and non-discriminatory. 2
The Mountain Pacific rule assumes even greater importance when the remedy
for its violation is considered.2r All money exacted from employees, i.e., dues and
assessments, during the six-month period preceding the filing of the charge must
be reimbursed.28 Initially this remedy was applied only where such payments were
exacted pursuant to the illegal contract,2 but the Board recently announced that
the remedy would be asserted whenever a contract providing for exclusive hiring
by a union did not meet the Mountain Pacific standards30
The status of the Mountain Pacific rule in the face of the instant case is now
doubtful, at least in the Ninth Circuit. It remains to be seen how it will be treated
elsewhere. The Board, however, is perhaps correct in observing that hiring halls
do inherently encourage union membership. To this degree the wisdom of the
rule is unquestionable. But Congress did not express a desire to prohibit such
encouragement, only to prevent practices which amount to the maintenance of a
closed shop and its attendant vices.3' It is also doubtful that the Board's requisite
guaranties would prevent discrimination if the parties are so disposed, nor does
it seem reasonable that such guaranties can effectively negate the encouragement
inherent in the arrangement itself. Noting that neither Congress nor the courts
have ever intimated that hiring halls are per se violative of the act, such a con-
struction by the Board cannot be supported. Even granting that the reasoning of
the Board is valid, the responsibility and authority for effecting such a change in
policy - and this interpretation must be considered a clear policy change - can
only rest with Congress. Further, the instant opinion, by approving the Board's
determinations, even to the limited degree of noting the possible validity of the
Mountain Pacific rule as a presumption of evidence, is equally unsupportable. It
can only serve to confuse and complicate an already subtle area of the law.
J. Michael Guenther
20 See E. & B. Brewing Co., 122 N.L.R.B. No. 50 (1958).
21 See C. Rasmussen & Sons, 122 N.L.R.B. No. 85 (1958).
22 See Consolidated Western Steel Div., 122 N.L.R.B. No. 107 (1959).
23 See, e.g., Roy Price, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 508 (1958).
24 See Armco Drainage & Metal Products, Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. No. 212 (1959).
25 See, e.g., Fluor Co., Ltd., 122 N.L.R.B. No. 154 (1958).
26 See Anchor Welding & Manufacturing Co., 123 N.L.R.B. No. 220 (1959); E. & B.
Brewing Co., 122 N.L.R.B. No. 50 (1958); K. M. & M. Constr. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1062(1958).
27 See, e.g., J. S. Brown-E. F. Olds Plumbing & Heating Corp., 115 N.L.R.B. 594 (1956).
See also letters of the General Counsel allowing moratoria of application of this remedy for
the purpose of enabling parties affected by the Mountain Pacific rule to conform their con-
tracts to the requisite standards. 5 CCH Lab. L. Rep. (4th ed.) No. 50060 (Feb. 7, 1958)
and No. 50074 (April 23, 1958).
28 Nassau and Suffolk Contractors' Ass'n., 123 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (1959).
29 See Farsworth & Chambers, Inc., 122 N.L.R.B. No. 41 (1958).
30 Nassau and Suffolk Contractors' Ass'n., 123 N.L.R.B. No. 167 (1959).
31 See S. RaP. No. 1287, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. (Remarks of Senator Taft) (1950).
But see, H. RaP. No. 1147, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. (1959). Regarding proposed amendments
to the Labor Management Relations Act, the REPoRT states: "Nothing in such provisions is
intended to restrict the applicability of the hiring hall provisions announced in the Mountain
Pacific case .... .
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PENOLOGY- APPELLATE REVIEW OF CRIMINAL SENTENCES-DEATH SEN-
TENCE OF YOUTH REDUCED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT.- Green, a fifteen year old
boy, pleaded guilty to the shotgun murder of a seventy-five year old drug store
owner. A three-judge court took testimony to determine the degree of guilt under
Pennsylvania's statute and unanimously found Green and his two accomplices guilty
of murder in the first degree. After hearing testimony on mitigating circumstances,
the court sentenced Green to death by electrocution and his accomplices to life im-
prisonment. On appeal, held, sentence of death vacated and the record remanded
with instructions that Green be sentenced to life imprisonment. Commonwealth v.
Green, 396 Pa. 137, 151 A.2d 241 (1959).
The scope of appellate review of criminal sentences was limited early in the
history of this country to those cases where the punishment exceeded that warranted
by law. In Shepherd v. Commonwealth' the trial judge sentenced the defendant
to a term in the house of correction in excess of that prescribed by statute, though
not longer than the term allowed in the alternative to be served in the state prison.
On appeal, the Massachusetts court adjudged itself powerless to send the case back
for a new sentence or to pronounce a new one itself. Relying on two English cases,
King v. Ellis2 and King v. Bourne,' the court reversed the trial judge and discharged
the defendant. The only justification in limiting the alternatives open to the re-
viewing court to blanket approval or reversal is to be found in procedural hobbles.
Appeal was had by writ of error. In effect the question posed was whether the
trial court was wholly right or not.
4
The procedural anomaly which required the Massachusetts court to free a con-
victed criminal has been corrected in virtually every jurisdiction by statutes per-
mitting reduction of sentences by appellate courts.5 However the statutes are usually
silent in cases where the sentence is within the limits prescribed by statute, but
unusually harsh in the particular case. State courts have taken various approaches
to the problem of reviewing a lower court's sentencing discretion.
In a few jurisdictions, the appellate courts are given express statutory authority
to reduce legal but excessive sentences.6 Under most statutes, the appellate court
is given power to "reverse, affirm or modify" the sentence of the trial judge, but
the majority of jurisdictions do not construe this grant to include the power to re-
duce a legal sentence.7 In the minority, the appellate courts of Pennsylvania,8 Ari-
1 43 Mass (2 Meto.) 419 (1841).
2 5 Barn. & Cress. 395, 108 Eng. Rep. 147 (1826).
3 7 Adolph. & Ellis 58, 112 Eng. Rep. 393 (1837). Interestingly enough, the sentence
here was transportation across the seas for seven years although the only prescribed penalty
according to statute was death.
4 But see People v. Farrell, 146 Mich. 264, 109 N.W. 440 (1906), where this view
was presented and rejected because of a belief that "a general superintending control over all
inferior courts" authorized the supreme court to do more - in this case to remand to the
trial court with directions.
5. See Annot., 29 ALR 313 (1924) and cases cited at 314-18; Supp. Annot., 89 ALR
295 (1934) and cases cited at 296-8.
6 The supreme court . . . may affirm, reverse, or modify the judgment,
or render such judgment as the district court should have done, or order a
new trial, or reduce the punishment, but cannot increase it. IowA CODE
ANN. § 793.18 (1946).
Similar provisions can be found in N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 543 (McKinney 1958) and
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2308 (1956). In Bates v. United States, 10 FED. 92, (C.C.N.D. Ill.
1881), the circuit court held that it had power to reduce the sentence of the district court
under 20 Stat. 826 (1891). The appellate jurisdiction of the circuit courts was transferred
to the circuit courts of appeal by 26 Stat. 826 (1891). Since that time federal courts have
denied the existence of that power, United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 605 (2d
Cir. 1952), although they almost certainly would have exercised it, had they believed in its
existence. Nash v. United States 54 F.2d 1006, 1008 (2d Cir. 1932).
7 Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentences on Appeal, 37 COLUm. L. REv. 521, 524 (1937).
Accord, People v. Odle, 37 Cal. 2d 52, 230 P.2d 345 (1951), Stanford v. State, 110 So.2d
1 (Fla. 1959).
RECENT DECISIONS
zona,9 Idaho,' 0 and Oklahoma 1 regularly reduce trial court sentences.
By statute in Pennsylvania, the penalty for murder in the first, degree is either
death or life imprisonment, at the discretion of the jury if the defendant pleads not
guilty, or of the court in cases of pleas of guilty.' 2 When the evidence warrants a
verdict of first degree murder, the appellate court is justified in modifying the sen-
tence for "a manifest abuse of discretion," 13 or where the trial court has "overlooked
pertinent facts or has disregarded the force of evidence or erred in its law." 1
The question is not whether the appellate court would have imposed the death
penalty, but whether the discretion vested in the court below was judicially exer-
cised.' 5 In inquiries of this sort, there is a strong presumption in favor of the cor-
rectness of the trial court sentence. Such is the import of the oft-voiced requirement
of a "manifest abuse of discretion." ' 6
In the instant opinion, the court expressly limited its scope of review to the
question of whether there was an abuse of discretion by the lower court in imposing
the death penalty. The defendant, at age 15, was prima facie capable of the com-
mission of a capital crime under the common law rule which prevails in Pennsyl-
vania. As the dissent pointed out, the majority proceeded upon the principle that
"the imposition of the death penalty by a judicial tribunal should be made only
when it is the sole penalty justified both by the criminal act and the criminal him-
self."'17 Finding nothing in the record of the boy's background and character, the
court found an abuse of discretion in the imposition of the death penalty because
of a failure to consider exhaustively all the facts surrounding the criminal act .and
the criminal actor. The majority clearly required an unspecified minimum amount
of research as a prerequisite to the death penalty.
The dissent took issue with the a priori statement that the death penalty may
only be imposed in the absence of all mitigating factors. This rule would place upon
the prosecution the burden of disproving any proffered mitigation, rather than re-
quiring the defense to establish it.' In support of this contention, the majority cited
several cases as holding that a jury, in choosing the penalty for first degree murder,
must consider all the evidence, including data on the defendant's character. The
cited cases do not support the contention. On the contrary, in Commonwealth v.
Wooding,'9 the court said that no instruction as to factors affecting the propriety
of a penalty need be given, even after evidence tending toward mitigation is intro-
duced. The entire question may be left to the discretion of an uninstructed jury.2"
8 Commonwealth v. Garramore, 307 Pa. 507, 161 Ad. 733 (1932); Commonwealth v.
Irelan, 341 Pa. 43, 17 A.2d 897 (1941).
9 State v. Fenton, 86 Ariz. 111, 341 P.2d 237 (1959).
10 State v. Linebarger, 71 Idaho 255, 232 P.2d 669 (1951).
11 Schoolcraft v. State, 84 Okla. Crim. 20, 178 P.2d 641 (1947).
12 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701(1945).
13 Commonwealth v. Hough, 358 Pa. 247, 56 A.2d 84 (1948); Commonwealth v. Jones,
355 Pa. 522, 50 A.2d 317 (1947).
14 Commonwealth v. Sterling, 314 Pa. 76, 170 A. 58 (1934); Commonwealth v. Hawk,
328 Pa. 417, 196 Atl. 5 (1938).
15 Commonwealth v. Howell, 338 Pa. 577, 13 A.2d 521, 522 (1940).
16 In Commonwealth v. Taranow, 359 Pa. 342, 59 A.2d 53 (1948), the court observed
that there has been no instance where the penalty imposed by a jury in first degree murder
cases has been modified on appeal, and only two instances where the courts' pronouncement
was deemed to be an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Garramore, 307 Pa. 507, 161
At. 733 (1932) and Commonwealth v. Irelan, 341 Pa. 43, 17 A.2d 897 (1941). Except for
the instant case, this appears to be a correct statement of the record to date.
17 151 A.2d 241, 247.
18 "In legal contemplation, the one penalty is just as 'normal' as the other for murder
in the first degree." There would be no error in imposing life imprisonment even where no
mitigating factor was shown to exist. Commonwealth v. Hough, 258 Pa. 247, 56 A.2d 84
(1948).
19 355 Pa. 438, 50 A.2d 328 (1947).
20. Id., at 330.
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The dissent also took issue with the majority's final order, requiring a life im-
prisonment sentence and directing the trial court to impose it. This, according to
the dissenter, was usurpation of the lower court's discretion. The lower court was
given no opportunity to review its sentence2 ' in the light of this decision, but was
relegated to carrying out the decision of the Supreme Court. However, the order in
the instant case is identical to that in Commonwealth v. Garramore2 2 and Common-
wealth v. Irelan.23
The question of abuse of discretion revolves around appropriateness of penalty
in view of the peculiar facts of the case. It is seemingly an insoluble dilemma with-
out basic agreement upon a theory of penology. While a surface difference between
the opinions might be found in their conclusions as to the defendant's ability and
character, it is at least possible that a deeper disagreement separates majority and
dissent here. This is no classic dichotomy between reformation and retribution.
Both opinions speak of penalty; both sentences will restrain; neither proposes edu-
cation for a return to society. The difference in deterrent effect would seem negli-
gible,24 although the dissent is apparently of the opposite opinion.
The difference is not so much what each opinion emphasizes - each goes to
some length to justify the penalty according to the capabilities and character of the
defendant - as what each deprecates. The majority criticized what it considered
yielding to the public plaint and concentration upon the crime to the exclusion of
consideration of the criminal. The dissent, with tongue in cheek, suggested that the
holding of the majority is: "It shall be unlawful for a trial court to impose the
death penalty on any murderer who is under - years of age." 25
It is undesirable, indeed impossible, to have a penal system reflecting only one
basic theory of penology; 26 and it would seem at least difficult to have a judge so
simply motivated. In the narrow choice between death and life imprisonment, what
theories of punishment are to be given greater emphasis?
The course of the law thus far in Pennsylvania, if it does not establish the
penalty according to the theory of retribution, at least indicates that personal cul-
pability will set an outer limit upon the sentence.2 7 It is in this spirit that the ma-
jority felt itself compelled to consider whether the responsibility of the defendant
as a moral agent was proportionate to the sentence imposed. This concept of the
criminal as moral agent requires much more than a showing of legal sanity. It in-
cludes, as the majority indicates, factors which will neither negate responsibility nor
absolve its breach, but will tend to contract the area of free choice available to the
defendant.28
The dissent contented itself with a showing of legal sanity as contained in the
psychiatrists' report and a past history of delinquent behavior, reflecting a traditional
reluctance in judges to consider more than bare sanity, a refusal to delve into psy-
chological responsibility and use a different standard to sentence than the jury uses
to convict. From a footnote29 it appears that the dissent had in mind the value of
21 In Commonwealth v. Jones, 355 Pa. 522, 50 A.2d 317 (1947), the court said:
It does not lie within our province, as an appellate court, to attempt a
catalogue of relative grades or shades of brutality, viciousness or depravity
as a fixed and immutable standard for juries or trial courts in appraising
death in one instance and life imprisonment in the other as the appropriate
penalty for murder.
22 Commonwealth v. Garramore, 307 Pa. 507, 161 At. 733 (1932).
23 Commonwealth v. Irelan, 341 Pa. 43, 17 A.2d 897 (1941).
24 See generally Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 401
(1958).
25 151 A.2d 241, 251, n.4.
26 Hart, supra note 24, at 401.
27 Commonwealth v. Garramore, 307 Pa. 507, 161 Atl. 733 (1932); Commonwealth v.
Irelan, 341 Pa. 43, 17 A.2d 897 (1941).
28 Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 151 A.2d 241, 247 (1959).
29 Id. at 251, n.6.
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the lower court's judgment as a deterrent to the mounting crime rate. It is this view
which indicates that the philosophy of the dissenter is not narrowly retributive, but
finds some value in the deterrent effects of punishment, a confidence he shares with
the layman, although possibly not with the modem penologist.
It would appear that what is termed "a manifest abuse of discretion" meriting
reversal, may in reality be only a difference in emphasis upon one of the various
theories of penology by the judges participating in the instant case. So long as the
controversy is unresolved and the courts refuse or are unable to establish universal
standards for the imposition of sentence, the possibility of appellate modification of
the death penalty is present in any capital case. Gerald M. Gallivan
